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Natural gas sits in deposits across vast regions of the United States, and 
hydraulic fracturing (fracking) is the current method used to extract it. Fracking 
for natural gas has been billed as the next economic boon to poor communities 
and the key to mitigating the negative effects of climate change. But fracking also 
involves risks: risks to our environment, to our communities, and to our markets. 
To date, the debate about fracking-and efforts to address concerns about the 
risks of fracking-has largely been a debate about who should regulate, the federal 
government, the states, or some combination of the two. Framing the current 
fracking debate as a federalism question is a mistake. 
This Article argues that the narrow frame of the current fracking debate 
misses important features of the problem. It argues that fracking is best understood 
within the much broader context of development in the United States, and more 
specifically as an example of an approach to development called "hybridity." The 
Article maps hybridity as comprised of the following three key features: (1) private 
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actors engaged in difficult-to-regulate activities, (2) involvement of public goods, 
and (3) creation of systemic risk. Drawing together the financial crisis of 2008, the 
BP oil spill of 2010, and fracking shows that all three share the common features 
of hybridity, and give rise to a similar suite of concerns. Regulation alone is not 
sufficient to address these concerns. Instead, the Article proposes several ways in 
which the hybridity off racking might be disrupted, thereby easing the overall risks 
off racking while realizing its potential benefits. 
Hybridity: An approach to economic development that is not easily regulated, 
engages a public good, and creates systemic risk. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
America is dying, and fracking may be here to save it. 
In the summer of 2012 we watched the worst drought on record since the 
Dust Bowl unfold. 1 Farmers from Kansas to Texas witnessed the slow death of 
cattle and the gradual drying up of wells used to sustain life for generations. 2 The 
same summer, overpowering fires swept through Colorado, utilizing the dry 
landscape ravaged by mountain pine beetles as timber to fuel the fires. 3 A few 
months later, a devastating "superstorm" named Sandy swept through the 
northeastern United States. 4 The storm brought with it a deadly mix of snow, 
sleet, rain, and high wind, all of which brought the nation's largest eastern cities 
to an unprecedented standstill. 5 The storm marked the tail end of a year 
punctuated by global extremes and firsts. 6 
1. John Eligon. A Drought Leaves Cracks in a Way of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2012, at A24 
("Nearly two-thirds of the continental United States is in moderate to exceptional drought, according 
to the government, the most widespread dryness in five and a half decades. "). 
2. John Eligon, Drought Disrupts Everyday Tasks in Rural Midwest, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2012, 
at A13 ("The wells supplying people's homes are running dry here at the heart of the nation's 
drought, ... centered in the parched earth of the southern Midwest."); Michael Overall, From Dust to 
Dust, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 18, 2012, at A9 (drawing a comparison to the Dust Bowl, the author 
provides evidence of drought-caused cattle death, noting the experience of a ten-year-old who "came 
home from school one day to find the family's cattle lying in a ditch"). See infra notes 3-11 and 
accompanying text for more discussion on troubling climate trends and their effect. 
3. Climate scientists have noted the relationship between continuing weather changes, mountain 
pine beetle infestation, drought, and increased wildfires. Essentially, warmer temperatures during the 
winter have increased mountain pine beetle reproductivity. The effect has been an infestation of 
beetles that feed on and kill pine trees; the dead trees then act as fuel for wildfires. See Sally Embrey, 
Justin V. Remais & Jeremy Hess, Climate Change and Ecosystem Disruption: The Health Impacts of 
the North American Rocky Mountain Pine Beetle Infestation, 102 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 818,822 (2012) 
("Increased fire risk poses one of the most immediate human health concerns stemming from pine 
beetle infestation. Massive forest die-off increases fuel loads, thus escalating the risk of fire. 
Additionally, pine beetle outbreaks often coincide with prolonged periods of drought, which itself 
contributes to increased risk and severity of forest fires.") (footnote omitted). 
4. Tom Howell Jr., Sandy Socks East Coast: Superstorm Hits 50 Million with Rain and Wind, 
WASH. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2012, at A1. 
5. /d. 
6. Just as the United States experienced extreme weather conditions, the same was true for 
much of the rest of the world. Severely cold weather in central and eastern Europe killed eight 
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Research suggests that these events sit squarely within a larger trend of 
rising temperatures, ocean acidification, and general degradation of the planet. 7 
Climate instability is the new normal.s The focus is no longer only on averting 
climate change, but on adapting to climate change. 9 What has become 
increasingly evident is that the earth humans will inhabit in the next generation 
will be unlike the earth upon which prior civilizations once thrived. 10 There is, as 
Professor J.B. Ruhl suggests, "no analog" to our climate future. 11 
hundred people in February alone. The southern Philippine island of Mindanao was hit with its 
strongest storm ever, killing over one thousand, while the United Kingdom experienced its worst 
drought in four decades, just as the United States had. See Justin Grieser, Top 5 International Weather 
Events of 2012, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2012, 11:36 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.comlblogs/capital-
weather -ganglpostltop-5-in terna ti onal-wea ther -even ts-of -2012/2012/12/311971 dc 172 -5362 -11 e2 -8bge-d 
d8773594efc_blog.html. Back in the United States. severe drought and wildfires were preceded by a 
string of deadly tornados in the spring, which ravaged through the Midwest. Over the course of just 
five days, one hundred fifty tornados were reported to have hit across a dozen states. Alan Taylor, 
Tornados Roar Through South, Midwest, ATLANTIC (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
infocus/2012/03/tornadoes-roar-through-south-midwestl100256/. 
7. Seth Borenstein. Study Links Warming to Some 2012 Wild Weather, Pr. WAYNE J. GAZETfE 
(IND.), Sep. 6,2013, at 9A (citing to a study by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
in which scientists found that the magnitude and likelihood of the summer heat waves in the United 
States, Superstorm Sandy flooding, and droughts in Europe were increased due to climate change). 
8. Recent data suggests that 2001-10 was the most active decade since 1855 for tropical 
cyclones. Between 1981 and 2010, an average of twelve named storms occurred per year, while in 2005 
alone there were twenty-seven named storms. WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION, WMO-
No. 1119, THE GLOBAL CLIMATE 2001-2010: A DECADE OF CLIMATE EXTREMES SUMMARY REPORT 
11 (2013). 
9. See Facing the Consequences: Adapting to Climate Change, ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 2010, at 85 
("Analysts who have long worked on adaptation to climate change-finding ways to live with scarcer 
water, higher peak temperatures, higher sea levels and weather patterns at odds with those under 
which today's settled patterns of farming developed-are starting to see their day in the 
uncomfortably hot sun."). 
10. See BILL McKIBBEN, EAARTH: MAKING A LIFE ON A TOUGH NEW PLANET xiv (1st ed. 
2010). The author begins by illustrating the severity of climate change by describing notable and 
noticeable small-scale changes in his community that have occurred since his previous writings on the 
subject in the late 1980s to illustrate the severity of climate change. These rapid changes in climate 
activity inform McKibben's underlying hypothesis-we can no longer avoid the serious consequences 
associated with global climate change. Id. Instead, in this new era of climate change, we must 
1d. 
consider-urgently-how to live [in this world]. We can't simply keep stacking boulders 
against the change that's coming on every front; we'll need to figure out what parts of our 
lives and our ideologies we must abandon so that we can protect the core of our societies and 
civilizations. There's nothing airy or speculative about this conversation; it's got to be 
uncomfortable, staccato, direct. 
11. J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to the No-
Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV 1, 5 (2008). A no-analog climate future suggests that we lack any 
experience on which to base projections of ecosystem change and that the models currently employed 
to "allow active management decisions as climate change takes effect are presently rudimentary and 
imprecise." Id. at 11. 
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In the United States, amid this extreme and unprecedented12 climatic 
instability, a weakened economy limps along. 13 Millions of Americans continue 
to beat the pavement in search of employment.J4 As of 2013, New York City, a 
beloved paragon of American success, boasted an 8.5% unemployment rate,15 
consistent with the nation's 7 to 10% unemployment rate from 2009 through 
mid-2013. 16 Among African-Americans in the city, the rate is much higher. One 
report estimates that, more than four years after the beginning of the Great 
Recession, a shocking 50% of African-American males ages eighteen to twenty-
five were out of work, and those who did eventually find employment spent a 
year doing SO.17 Moreover, the gap between America's wealthiest and poorest 
12. See, e.g., Bill McKibben, The Reckoning, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 2, 2012, at 52. McKibben 
contends that while the seriousness of our environmental predicament increases, it receives little 
political consideration. In June of 2012, record high temperatures were recorded 3,215 times. While 
temperatures increase, so too does the rate by which carbon-emitting energy sources are used. Year 
after year, record amounts of carbon dioxide have been spilled in the atmosphere. Pairing these 
numbers together, scientists suggest that in just sixteen years there will be a temperature increase of 
about eleven degrees Fahrenheit, which would create conditions that make the planet uninhabitable. 
See also Kenneth Chang, Research Cites Role of Warming in Extremes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, at 
A6 (noting that climate-related sea-level rise is creating a "looming crisis" for coastal communities); 
Justin Gillis, Climate Panel Cites Near Certainty on Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2013, at Al 
(stating that a temperature increase of five degrees Fahrenheit "would lead to widespread melting of 
land ice, extreme heat waves, difficulty growing food and massive changes in plant and animal life, 
probably including a wave of extinctions"). 
13. Since the end of the Great Recession, real GDP growth has hovered around 2.1 %. Andrew 
Fieldhouse, 5 Years After the Great Recession, Our Economy Still Far from Recovered, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Aug. 26, 2014, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.comlandrew-fieldhouse/five-years-after-
the-grea_b_5530597.html; see also U.S. Poverty Rises Despite Economic Recovery, REUTERS (Sept. 17, 
2013, 7 :06 PM), http://www.reuters.com!article/2013/09/17 lus-usa-economy-poverty-idUSBRE98GO 
PN20130917. See infra notes 14-23, 81-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the financial crisis 
and its effects on the American economy. 
14. As of September 2013, the unemployment rate stood at 7.3%, down from the prior year 
when it was 8.1 %. Even so, the addition of jobs has been sluggish with the Labor Department having 
to revise its numbers downward for the previous two months after concluding job growth was less than 
expected. Dominic Rushe, U.s. Unemployment Rate Drops to 7.3% Amid Sluggish Economic 
Recovery, GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2013, 9:14 EDT), http://www.theguardian.comlbusiness/2013/sep/06/us-
jobless-numbers-economic-recovery. As of December 2014, the unemployment rate declined to 5.6%. 
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ECONOMIC NEWS RELEASE (2015), available 
at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nrO.htm. 
15. Labor Statistics for the New York City Region, N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF LABOR, 
http://www.labor.ny.gov/stats/nyc/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). In August 2013, the state of New York 
outpaced the rest of the country in job growth. Press Release, New York State Department of Labor, 
State's Private Sector Job Count Grows by 22,700 in August, 2013 to Historic Record High (Sept. 19, 
2013), http://labor.ny .gov!pressreleases!2013!september-19-2013.shtm. Nonetheless, unemployment 
figures loomed above 8% in New York City. In August 2013, despite hiring gains, the unemployment 
rate rose from 8.4 to 8.6%. Patrick McGeehan, New York City's fobless Rate Increased to 8.6% in 
August Despite Hiring Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20.2013, at A26. 
16. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CHARTING THE LABOR MARKET: 
DATA FROM THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (CPS) (Mar. 6, 2015), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cps_charts.pdf. 
17. Patrick McGeehan, Blacks Miss Out as fobs Market Rebounds in City, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 
2012, at AI. 
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citizens continues to grow. IS Indeed, the rich appear to be getting richer, while 
the poor inch ever further away from the American dream. 19 After several 
generations of steady growth20 and stabilization of the middle class,21 deep 
inequality is the new economic reality in the United States. 22 As of late 2013, 
46.5 million people-IS % of the country-were living in deep poverty.23 
18. As of 2013, the poverty rate stood at about 15%, which is defined as an average income of 
$23,492 for a family of four. Forty-four percent of those living in poverty, though, are living in "deep 
poverty," which is defined as living at half of the poverty rate. Since 2000, levels of deep poverty have 
been continually rising and have almost surpassed the highest level since the data has been available in 
1975. Neil Shah, U.S. Poverty Rate Stabilizes-For Some, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11,2013, 10:41 AM), 
http://online.wsj.comJnews/articles/SBl0001424052702304500404579127603306039292; see also 
Eduardo Porter, Inequality in America: The Data Is Sobering, N.Y. TIMES, July 31,2013, at Bl (noting 
that inequality in America is stark in comparison to other industrialized countries by focusing on 
statistics beyond the federal poverty line). Among the indicators that contribute to systemic poverty is 
education. Sixty percent of disadvantaged children in the United States go to underresourced schools, 
which have fewer and lower quality resources, and the literacy gap between the top U.S. test takers-
who fall at the ninetieth percentile of distribution-and those scoring in the middle is almost as big as 
the gap between the average score in the United States and Azerbaijan. Id. 
19. See U.S. Poverty Rises Despite Economic Recovery, supra note 13 (noting that "[t]he 
recovery from the worst recession since the 1930s has been marked by a jump in stock prices to record 
highs, aided in part by the Federal Reserve's ultra easy monetary policy"); see also Annie Lowrey, A 
Budget Focus on Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10,2013,4:52 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.coml 
2013/04/1O/a-budget-focus-on-inequality/?_php=true&_type=b10gs&_r=0 (noting that "it is not a bad 
time to be rich. Job growth in high-wage professions has been decent, if not spectacular"). However, 
the middle class has suffered mightily in the Great Recession, as median income has declined and the 
"recovery has seen middle-class jobs effectively replaced with low-income jobs." Id. Viewing economic 
statistics in isolation does not provide a full picture with respect to the attainability of the American 
dream. While economic statistics are certainly bleak for many in the United States, arguably 
nervousness and uncertainty that plague most Americans' lives have also coalesced to create a greater 
barrier to the achievement of the American dream than a depressed economy; there is now a 
psychological disconnect between reality and the belief in achieving the American dream. A recent 
survey found that almost half the country feels that it is not possible to achieve the American dream in 
our economy. The American Dream Might As Well Be Dead: Here's Proof, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 
25,2013,9:07 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.coml2013/10/25/american-dream-dead_n_ 4156505.html. 
20. See, e.g., Christopher Matthews, Is U.S. Economic Growth a Thing of the Past?, TIME (Sept. 
4, 2012), http://business.time.comJ2012/09/04/is-u-s-economic-growth-a-thing-of-the-past ("[S]ince the 
end of World War II, the U.S. economy has averaged GDP growth of more than 3% per year."). 
21. See Hedrick Smith, Middle Class Mayday, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2013, at 25 (arguing that 
economic growth for middle-class Americans peaked in the mid-1970s-from 1945 to 1973, the income 
of the average family grew 95%-but since then, while American productivity has increased 
dramatically, average family income has not). 
22. Economist Emmanuel Saez found from 1993 to 2000 the top 1 % of the United States 
population posted the largest gains in household income at 86.1 %, but in the bottom 99% growth was 
many times less, at 6.6%. University of California at Berkeley, Emmanuel Saez, Professor of 
Economics, Director, Center for Equitable Growth, Emanuel Saez, UNIV. OF CAL. AT BERKELEY, 
http://elsa.berkeley.edul-saezl (under heading "Papers by Topic" locate listing for "Income Inequality 
in the United States, 1913--1998" with Thomas Piketty, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1),2003, 
1-39; then click "Tables and Figures Updated to 2012 in Excel format, September 2013). 
23. See U.S. Poverty Rises Despite Economic Recovery, supra note 13 (noting that against a 
poverty threshold of $23,492 for a family of four, in 2012, "[a]bout 16.1 million children and 3.9 million 
people aged 65 years and older were living in poverty"). 
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And yet, there is a flash of hope for both climate change and economic 
conditions. An oil and natural gas boom is afoot,24 which could reduce America's 
dependence on foreign oil, provide a "cleaner" energy future by reducing our 
dependence on carbon-intensive coaI,25 keep energy costs low, and also bring 
desperately needed financial resources to cash-strapped regions. 26 
Approximately 616 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (the equivalent of 102 billion 
barrels of crude oil) lay trapped in shale deposits, or "plays," around the 
country.27 The largest shale play in the United States runs through Appalachia.28 
24. Estimates by the U.S. Energy Information Administration suggest that by 2040 domestic 
crude oil and natural gas production will help to lower domestic consumption of imported energy from 
30%, its 2005 percentage, down to 4%. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 
EARLY RELEASE OVERVIEW (2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/er/pdfl0383er 
(2014).pdf. 
25. Conventional wisdom holds that the use of natural gas as an energy source is 
environmentally more sustainable than burning coal because natural gas burns much cleaner; however, 
increased scrutiny into natural gas production reveals possible environmental pitfalls that may be 
associated with natural gas. See, e.g., Suzanne Goldenberg. Fracking Produces Annual Toxic Waste 
Water Enough to Flood Washington DC. GUARDIAN (Oct. 4. 2013, 7:01 EDT), 
http://www.theguardian.com/environmentJ2013/octJ04/fracking-us-toxic-waste-water-washington 
(citing study which found that fracking in America generated 280 billion gallons of toxic waste water, 
enough to flood all of Washington D.C. beneath a twenty-two foot lagoon of toxic sludge); David 
Jolly, French Court Upholds Ban on Hydraulic Fracturing. N.V. TIMES, Oct. 12,2013, at B2 (citing to 
the European resolve that hydraulic fracturing is not an environmentally sound technique, which 
forms the basis of France's decision to disallow production of natural gas through this method); 
Richard Harris, Natural Gas May Be Easier On Climate Than Coal, Despite Methane Leaks, NPR (Sept. 
16,2013, 5:55 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/09/16/223122924/despite-leaks-during-production-natural-
gas-still-better-than-coal (citing study that found that methane, which leaks into the atmosphere as a 
byproduct of natural gas production, could potentially wipe out the positive climatic benefits of 
natural gas). Moreover, there is increased discussion and concern that the popularization of natural 
gas production may lead to a lag in the development of more efficient and environmentally sound 
renewable energies. See generally Chirag Rathi, Will Natural Gas Compete or Coexist with Renewable 
Power?, POWER ENGINEERING, Nov. 2012, at 14 (noting that other potentially efficient means of 
renewable energy have "yet to be even explored"); Donald F. Santa Jr., Is North American Natural 
Gas Infrastructure Up to Complementing Wind, Solar?, NAT. GAS & ELEC., August 2011, at 7, 7 
(questioning what the "greater use ofrenewable energy sources mean[sJ for the natural gas industry"); 
Richard G. Smead, Natural Gas-Competitor With Renewables, Bridge Fuel, or One of the Gang?, 
NAT. GAS & ELEC., Sept. 2009, at 27, 29 (recognizing the "challenge ... to find a long-term fit for 
natural gas with the development of alternatives"). 
26. In 2012, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo came under fire for his energy proposal, 
which limited the sites of hydrofracking to a few counties, all which are economically depressed. See 
Danny Hakim, Cuomo Proposal Would Restrict Gas Drilling to a Struggling Region, N.V. TIMES, June 
14,2012, at At. A recent study found that lifting New York's hydraulic fracturing ban could generate 
$11.4 billion in economic output and help cash-strapped counties. TIMOTHY J. CONSIDINE, ROBERT W. 
WATSON & NICHOLAS B. CONSIDINE, THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES OF SHALE ENERGY 
DEVELOPMENT No.9, at 21 (2011), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdfleper_09.pdf. 
The counties that would reap the benefits of this policy change have suffered a cumulative loss of 
forty-eight thousand payroll jobs between 2000 and 2010. [d. at "Executive Summary." Despite those 
potential benefits, in 2014, New York imposed a statewide ban on fracking. Thomas Kaplan, Cuomo 
Bans Fracking, Saying Risks Trump Economic Potential, N.V. TIMES, Dec. 17,2014, at Al (discussing 
how, after much contention, New York banned hydraulic fracturing in the state). 
27. ANTHONY ANDREWS ET AL., CONGo RESEARCH SERV., R40894. UNCONVENTIONAL GAS 
SHALES: DEVELOPMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY ISSUES 2 (2009), available at https://www.fas.org! 
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Myriad others of various sizes and depths dot the landscape underlying some of 
the country's most populous regions-such as the Delaware River Basin 
(comprising New York, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey), and those 
long revered for their natural beauty, such as Colorado, Wyoming, and the Great 
Lakes Region. 29 A frequently referenced Energy Information Agency map of 
shale plays in the United States locates gas deposits in nearly half of the states in 
the Union. 30 This abundance might mitigate the effects of climate change by 
displacing more carbon-intensive coal, and yield enormous wealth for regions 
sitting on natural gas deposits. 
Indeed, some of the poorest regions in the country3! have begun to cash in 
on natural gas deposits through fracking, a method of oil and natural gas 
development that deploys the unconventional mechanism of hydraulic 
fracturingY Moreover, fracking appears to be everywhere: on private land, 
federally owned land, state-owned land, and even the ocean floor. 33 Utilizing 
vertical and horizontal drilling techniques, fracking allows developers 
economically to extract natural gas from previously unreachable deposits. This 
technology has revolutionized the energy industry and permanently altered the 
rural landscape. 
Not only is natural gas touted as the savior that will create jobs34 and deliver 
Americans from the evils of oil dependence, its proponents argue that natural 
sgp/crs/misC/R40894.pdf (noting that of the existing natural gas resources in the United States, shale 
gas represents a third, or the equivalent of approximately 102 billion barrels of crude oil). 
28. Id. at 2-3. 
29. Id. at 3. 
30. Lower 48 States Shale Plays, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/oil~as/ 
rpd/shale~as.pdf (last updated Jan. 8,2015). 
31. See Derrick Howard, Hydraulic Fracturing in the Appalachian Basin: Incorporating 
Environmental Justice to Regulate Natural Resource Exploration, 7 ApPALACHIAN NAT. RESOURCES 
L.J. 113, 123-26 (2013) (discussing poverty in Appalachia due to coal mining and the introduction of 
fracking to an already impoverished region); see also John MacCormack, Life on the Shale, MySA: 
SAN ANTONIO'S HOME PAGE (May 1, 2013, 9:44 PM), http://www.mysanantonio.comlnewsllocal_news/ 
articlelLife-on-the-Shale-3450563.php (explaining that the shale boom has changed the attitude of 
young workers in the economically depressed Texas region who were previously looking to move away 
because of slim opportunities and low wages). In addition, as a result of shale production, many 
already impoverished communities are saddled with additional social, environmental, infrastructure, 
and economic costs. The "boom-and-bust" nature of the industry places additional burdens on 
municipalities, which see their population grow as new enterprise settles in, spurring a greater need for 
state resources. At the same time, the impermanent nature of the industry jobs means that additional 
tax revenues cannot be depended upon to cover these additional costs. Susan Christopherson & Ned 
Rightor, How Shale Gas Extraction Affects Drilling Localities: Lessons for Regional and City Policy 
Makers, 2 J. TOWN & CITY MGMT. 350, 358-61 (2012). 
32. See infra Part III. OJ for an explanation of the fracking process. 
33. Miyoko Sakashita, Now They're Fracking California's Oceans?, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 
2014, 6:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.comlmiyoko-sakashita/now-theyre-fracking-california_b_ 
4046648.html. 
34. Prior to the state's ban, a 2011 estimate by the New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation put new job creation at between 13,491 and 53,969 including direct and 
indirect employment impacts. N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, FACT SHEET: 
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gas will cure our climate-change ills by producing "cleaner," more efficient 
energy.35 In the long run, this cleaner energy will be the tide that lifts all boats. 
The country shall prosper as never before, which will mean a boon for the 
financial markets. More importantly, these vast stores of "clean" energy will 
allow Americans to continue consuming energy, guilt-free, at the highest rates in 
the world. 36 
Not so fast. 
Natural gas may in fact provide both an economic boon to poor 
communities and help to reduce carbon emissions in the United States, but the 
picture is more complex. Some research suggests that relying on fracking as the 
method for curing climate and economic ills could leave us much worse off, 
debilitating fragile rural areas,37 polluting ground water,38 slowing more 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF HIGH-VOLUME HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN NEW YORK STATE (2011), 
available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/econimpact092011.pdf. 
35. See Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., About My Support for Natural Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,2011, at 
A21 (writing generally about his support for natural gas and stating that natural gas is cleaner than 
oil); see also Jim Inhofe & Carl Levin, Op-Ed., Fill 'er Up-With Natural Gas, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 
2014, at All ("Vehicles running on natural gas have cleaner emissions than gasoline-fueled 
vehicles."); Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., How to Frack Responsibly, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2012, at A25 
("Fracking's enemies can stamp their feet all they want, but that gas is too important to leave it in the 
ground."); Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., Pass the Boone Pickens Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2011, at A25 
("Natural gas is cheaper than oil. It's cleaner. And it's ours."); Suzanne Goldenberg, US Surpasses 
Russia as Wor/d's Top Oil and Natural Gas Producer, GUARDIAN (Oct. 4, 2013, 4:13 PM EDT), 
http://www.theguardian.com!business/2013/octl04/us-oil-natural-gas-production-russia-saudi-arabia 
(noting that the United States surpasses Russia as top producer). 
36. Christopher Helman, President Obama Gets It: Fracking Is Awesome, FORBES (Feb. 12, 
2013, 10:32 PM), http://www.forbes.comlsites/christopherhelmanl2013/02112/president-obama-gets-it-
fracking-is-awesomel ("Thanks to fracking, lower natural gas prices already save consumers $100 
billion a year .... Thanks to fracking, the United States can become not only energy independent of 
the rest of the world ... but definitely more energy secure. Fracking saves us money; fracking creates 
jobs; fracking reduces greenhouse gas emissions. God bless fracking."). 
37. The changes in Williston, North Dakota, a so-called fracking boomtown and self-proclaimed 
"Boomtown, USA," is emblematic of many of the drastic changes taking place in fracking country. See 
Ben Kesling, Oil Boomtown Williston, N.D., Looks for a Stable Future, WALL ST. J. (April 1, 2014, 7:51 
PM), http://online.wsj.comlnews/articles/SB10001424052702304026304579451561009244936. In 
Williston, so-called man camps have sprouted to house and feed the hundreds of workers who have 
descended upon the area to work for fracking companies. Women, a scarcity within the community, 
have also experienced shifts in the sense of safety and security within the community. A Tale of Two 
Rushes: There's Gold in Them There Wells, ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 
31767768; see also Susan Christopherson & Ned Rightor, The Boom-Bust Cycle of Shale Gas 
Extraction Economies, in THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF MARCELLUS SHALE GAS EXTRACTION: 
KEY ISSUES, CARDI REPORTS No. 14, at 4 (Susan Christopherson, ed., 2011) 4, available at 
http://www.greenchoices .comell.edu/downloads/development/shale/Economic_ Consequences. pdf 
(noting that "[w]hen drilling ceases because the commercially recoverable resource is depleted, there 
is an economic 'bust'-population and jobs depart the region, and fewer people are left to support the 
boomtown infrastructure"); see also Edna Wheless, Boom Time; Haynesville Shale Changes Rural 
Landscape and Lifestyle, LOUISIANA LIFE, Nov.-Dec. 2009, available at http://www.myneworleans.com 
ILouisiana-LifelNovember-December-2009IBoom-Timel (discussing effects of additional trucks and 
traffic on local community). 
38. See Stephen G. Osborn, Avner Vengosh, Nathaniel R. Warner & Robert B. Jackson, 
Methane Contamination of Drinking Water Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and Hydraulic 
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fundamental energy transformation, and destabilizing the financial markets. 39 
According to the research, many of the environmental harms could be 
irreversible, and the economic harm far-reaching. 4o 
The debate over fracking, its benefits, and its risks or harms is not isolated 
to academic corridors. Recent films, such as Gasland and Promised Land, point 
to the dangers associated with fracking and challenge its long-term 
sustainability.41 Pro-fracking narratives have also emerged in films such as 
Fracknation, which support fracking as a way out of the energy and economic 
morass the country now faces. 42 The debate is lively, and at times less than 
civil. 43 More often than not, the question of which level of government should 
regulate fracking, state or federal, is the focus. 44 
Within this narrow debate, proponents of federalism argue that states and 
localities are well suited to regulate fracking. On the other hand, opponents 
argue, fracking is too important an issue to leave to the states, localities, or 
industry. Leaving regulation to the states could lead to a race to the bottom. The 
federal government should move quickly to fill gaps in the existing regulatory 
framework and regulate fracking in the areas upon which it touches-water and 
air. In the middle is yet another group of scholars that urges a flexible approach 
to governance. They argue that an integrated federal and state approach to 
regulate the fracking industry may give rise to more broad-based solutions that 
have the buy-in of affected communities. 
Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 8172, 8172 (2011), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articlesfPMC3100993/pdflpnas.l100682108.pdf (finding evidence of 
methane contamination of shallow drinking water in three areas overlying the Marcellus Shale in 
Pennsylvania and the Utica Shale in New York, which could be caused by fracking); see also Kate 
Galbraith, California Plans Tighter Control of Fracking, but Not Enough for Some, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
14,2013, at B3 (noting opposition to using fracking in the Monterey Shale, which holds approximately 
two-thirds of the United States' recoverable shale oil, due to concerns about water and air pollution 
and earthquakes resulting from the disposal of fracking flowback, as well as opposition to offshore 
fracking in California). 
39. Of particular concern is the potential environmental impact of fracking on land subject to 
federal mortgages. When landowners lease land to fracking operators, the banks holding mortgages to 
such land bear the financial risk associated with a potential decline in property value due to 
environmental degradation. Ian Urbina, U.S. May Restrict Mortgages on Properties Leased for Oil and 
Gas Drilling, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2012, at A12. 
40. See infra Part 111.0.4 for a discussion of the potential environmental, social, and economic 
risks associated with fracking. 
41. GASLAND (New Video Group 2010); PROMISED LAND (Focus Features 2012). 
42. FRACKNATION (Hard Boiled Films 2013). 
43. Anti-fracking protests and arrests have been common in regions facing fracking decisions. 
Dan Bacher, In a Drought Emergency, Why Is California Pushing Fracking, RED, GREEN, AND BLUE, 
Jan. 25, 2014, available at 2014 WLNR 2193167; Molly Born, Green Groups March Downtown 
Pittsburgh; Handful Arrested, PIrro POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 21, 2013, at AI, available at 2013 WLNR 
26490305; Protesters Arrested as They Try to Stop 'Fracking' Trucks, MANCHESTER EVENING NEWS, at 
15, Nov. 28, 2013, available at 2013 WLNR 29953964. 
44. See, e.g., Michael Burger, The (Re)federalization of Fracking Regulation, 2013 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 1483, 1486 (2013) ("The debate over who should regulate fracking-the federal government or 
the states-has followed a parallel track to the broader cultural debates."). See infra Section IV for an 
overview of the current debate over fracking regulation. 
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This Article seeks to expand the lens of the governance debate. It argues 
that fracking and its regulation are best understood in the much broader context 
of the current U.S. development moment. The backdrop of the current U.S. 
development moment is characterized by extremes: extreme poverty, extreme 
gaps in wealth, extreme challenges to food production,45 extreme variability 
within the ecosystem,46 and extreme civil unrest. 47 At this moment, there is a 
struggle to create economic development initiatives, like fracking, that do not 
further exacerbate these extremes. When seen through a development lens, 
fracking can be understood as more than an isolated method of extracting 
natural gas; it is connected to a broader narrative regarding the approach to 
development in this development moment. 
Through a development lens, similarities among other development 
methodologies, such as high-risk mortgage lending or deep-sea drilling, and 
fracking crystalize. Indeed, all are characterized by a development approach that 
this Article refers to as "hybridity." Hybridity is a descriptive term that captures 
the complexity and problematic features of the current approach to development 
in the United States. Hybridity refers to the mixture of components that 
comprise the current approach to development. Under a hybridity approach, 
private actors engage in difficult-to-regulate activities that involve public goods 
and give rise to systemic risks. 
45. Although, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), U.S. farm output 
"more than doubled between 1948 and 2011, growing at an average annual rate of 1.49 percent," since 
1995, the level of food security of Americans, defined by the USDA as when a family is "unable ... to 
meet the needs of all their members because they had insufficient money or other resources for food" 
has steadily risen. In 2012, 14.51 % of Americans were identified by the USDA as food insecure, 
compared with 11.94% in 1995. Agricultural Productivity in the U.S., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECON. 
RESEARCH SERV., http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/agricultural-productivity·in-the-us.aspx (last 
updated June 13, 2014); Overview: Key Statistics & Graphics, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECON. 
RESEARCH SERV., http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-nutrition-assistance/food-security-in-the-us/key 
-statistics-graphics.aspx (last updated Jan. 12, 2015) (download chart data for specific numbers). 
Moreover, the declining global honeybee population could lead to future disruptions in the U.S. food 
supply. Since 2005, honeybees have been dying at alarming rates. In 2012, the malady, colony collapse 
disorder, led to the loss of 40 to 50% of the hives required to pollinate fruit and vegetables in the U.S. 
Nearly one-fourth of the U.s. diet depends on bee pollination, and fewer bees eventually leads to 
higher food prices. Douglas Quenqua, Existential Animal News and the World's Lightest Solid, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2013, at D2. 
46. NAT'L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., ABRUPT IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: 
ANTICIPATING SURPRISES (2013), available at http://www.nap.edulopenbook.php?record_id=18373. 
47. The Occupy Wall Street protests and civil unrest in Wisconsin in 2011 and 2012 marked a 
shift in the American discourse. Occupy Wall Street sparked a national discussion regarding inequality 
in America; the "99%" became a term that referred to Americans struggling to eke out a living in a 
society where the "1%" holds the vast majority of wealth. The discussion expanded beyond Wall 
Street into other cities and became a movement known as "Occupy." The Wisconsin protests against 
Republican Governor Scott Walker began as a protest against the governor's efforts to limit the 
bargaining rights of public employees and became the impetus for a national debate regarding the 
rights of workers. Kate Zernike & Susan Saulny, Standoffs, Protests and a Prank Call, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 25, 2011). http://www.nytimes.comJ2011/02/25/us/25states.html?pagewanted=all (noting conflicts 
in Wisconsin, Ohio, Indiana, Oklahoma, and Tennessee related to the rights of union workers). 
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Section II of the Article provides the framing. It introduces the 
development lens that facilitates the pulling together of seemingly disparate 
. events: the financial crisis, the BP oil spill, and fracking. Part ILB then describes 
the current development moment. Section II ends with an introduction to 
hybridity: private activity within a regulatory vacuum that regularly touches 
upon public goods and creates systemic risk. 
Section III examines hybridity as an approach to development in the 
current development moment. Parts IILA-C illustrate the dominant features of 
hybridity through two recent examples: the financial crisis and the BP oil spill. 
Part III.D then turns specifically to fracking. After providing an overview of the 
fracking method of extracting natural gas, Part III.D argues that fracking also fits 
within a hybrid approach to development. 
Section IV argues that locating fracking within the development and 
hybridity frame should inform our approach to fracking. The Section explores 
and critiques the regulatory approaches thus far proposed to address gaps in 
fracking regulation: state regulation, federal regulation, and an emerging, new 
governance (or experimentalist) approach. It critiques these proposals as too 
narrowly confined to regulation that is not likely to disrupt the hybridity of 
fracking. Instead of relying exclusively on regulatory schemes, Parts IY.B-C 
propose several ways in which the hybridity of fracking might be disrupted, 
thereby easing the overall risks associated with fracking. 
A coherent response to fracking would therefore focus on (1) exposing 
difficult-to-regulate private actors to the risks of their activities, (2) creating 
transactions that allow for proportionate risk and benefit sharing among public 
and private actors to mitigate harm to public goods, and (3) reducing project 
scale to minimize systemic risks. This conclusion suggests that, on the whole, a 
regulatory debate alone will not resolve the concerns of fracking, but an 
exploration of its hybridity may. 
II. FRAMING THE CURRENT U.S. DEVELOPMENT MOMENT 
This Section situates the current development moment within the context of 
several historical moments of economic development that are characterized by 
distinct approaches. These conceptual moments provide a useful frame from 
which to turn inward and view the current approach to development in the 
United States. Development is itself a contested term;48 however, for ease of 
discussion, this Article adopts a simplified definition of development: to foster 
economic growth. 49 This definition incorporates the Western orientation of 
48. See, e.g., Ruth E. Gordon & Jon H. Sylvester, Deconstructing Development, 22 WIS. INT'L 
L.J. 1, 9-10 (2004) (arguing that "the contemporary concept of development has a quite short history" 
and began as a political project in the years following World War II). 
49. Indeed, development is rooted in a paradigm that relies on a numerical valuation of poverty. 
For example, the $1.25 a day standard is used by the United Nations to quantify whether an individual 
lives in poverty. Millennium Development Goal, Goal 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty & Hunger, 
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.orglmillenniumgoals/poverty.shtml (last visited Mar. 6, 2015); see 
also JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 6 (3d ed. 
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development, which originated in the United States and has dominated both the 
discourse and methods of development since World War II.50 
Part ILA briefly outlines the history of modern development and traces the 
primary approaches to development since World War II. Part II.B argues that 
development in the United States is situated against a backdrop of extremes that 
comprise an immutable development moment. This moment is on par with the 
unique moments before it and is also characterized by specific approaches to 
economic growth. 
A. Development: A Brief History of Context and Responses 
The conceptualization of development in terms of "moments" is familiar 
within the development literature. In The New Law and Development, David 
Trubek and Alvaro Santos introduce three conceptual moments of development 
that begin at different points along a historical timeline. 51 This Part highlights 
the key features of each of Trubek and Santos's development moments. 
The Western development clock begins after World War II when Western 
leaders converged on Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to develop unified 
strategies to both govern a war-ravaged Europe and rebuild the continent. Thus, 
the Bretton Woods agencies-the International Monetary Fund and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank)-
and the United Nations were born, and a new method of global governance 
emerged. 52 The approach to development in the First Moment is characterized 
by a strong developmental state, import substitution, and the wholesale 
exporting of law from north to south. 53 
Over time, less-developed southern nations were incorporated into the 
evolving global governance framework. These states, identified as impoverished 
and in need of economic development, were integrated into the international 
community as subjects of development. In order to enhance the economic 
engines of poorer southern states, the North relied on rule of law initiatives and 
the exporting of U.S. legal models, grounded in legal liberalism. 54 Much of this 
exportation occurred in the postcolonial states of the global South, which were 
struggling to gain independent economic footing. The process of development 
2009) (stating that in 1985, one of every three people in the world-1.1 billion total-were classified as 
"extremely poor" by the World Bank, based on having less than $1 a day, and that by 2002,100 million 
fewer individuals were classified as such). 
50. David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and 
Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 1 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (noting that "it was only after World 
War II that systematic and organized efforts to reform legal systems became part of the practice of 
international development agencies" and that "development agencies turned to law as an instrument 
for state policy aimed at generating economic growth"). 
51. Id. at 2-3. 
52. Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 48, at 22-30. 
53. Trubek & Santos, supra note 50, at 5. 
54. David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the 
Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1070, 1086 (1974). 
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was thought necessary to increase state capacity to spur economic growth. 55 It 
was assumed that more laws, modeled on the U.S. legal system, would bring 
about greater access to justice, decrease corruption, and ultimately result in 
prosperity. 56 
The failure to acknowledge the cultural contexts in which legal liberalism 
was exported proved fatal to the First Moment. 57 An incoherent idea of the 
complex identity of the developmental state allowed for entrenchment of power 
by southern elites, and the deepening of poverty for those who lacked access to 
newly established legal institutions. 58 For these reasons, the development 
community largely deemed the First Moment a colossal failure. 59 Even those 
who served as its key architects remained deeply ambivalent and even skeptical 
of the rule of law development approach during this moment. 60 
The Cold War years marked a break from the strongly state-led approaches 
to development. Development proponents in the global North deemed the 
development state inefficient and incapable of leading its own development 
initiatives, and so, in the 1980s, Western leaders emerged with new sets of ideas 
to foster economic growth in the global South. 61 The Second Moment began 
during the Thatcher-Reagan era, and its approach is marked by neoliberalism: a 
turn to markets to resolve development issues. 62 During this time, neoliberalism, 
as reflected in the so-called Washington Consensus, gained prominence. 63 Under 
a neoliberal approach to development, its proponents suggested that private 
entities and the market, rather than public actors, would expertly and efficiently 
lead southern states to economic growth. 64 
As the privately led, free-market approach to development became more 
widely accepted during the Second Moment, southern states appeared no better-
off. Indeed, developmental states suffered tremendously during this period. 65 
Many postcolonial Latin American and African nations lacked resources to 
implement state-led development projects, and turned to the Bretton Woods 
agencies for assistance. Through structural adjustment programs, the 
development banks conditioned loans to countries on the incorporation of 
55. Id. at 1073-74. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 1080-81,1090. 
58. Id. at 1083. 
59. Id. at 1089-93. 
60. See generally id. 
61. Trubek & Santos, supra note 50, at 2. 
62. Id. at 5. 
63. See Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 48, at 44-48. 
64. Trubek & Santos, supra note 50, at 5-6. 
65. See, e.g., Chantal Thomas, Law and Neoclassical Economic Development in Theory and 
Practice: Toward and Institutionalist Critique of Institutionalism, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 1018 (2011) 
(noting failures of law reform projects due to "repeated, mechanistic and cookie-cutter approaches 
that fail either because they are resisted by or incompatible with the local context, or because they are 
manipulated by powerful interests at the expense of the larger population whose social welfare is the 
nominal goal"). 
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Western property and contract right regimes into their legal systems.66 The loan 
programs aimed, in theory, to attract private foreign investors to developing 
countries based on new, predictable systems of law. 67 The loans proliferated with 
complex consequences. This development approach also failed to deliver the 
economic growth promised by neoliberalism. Therefore, many developmental 
states emerged from the 1990s saddled with debt and with unequal trade and 
other relationships due to structural adjustment programs. 68 
As described by Trubek and Santos, in the Third Moment, beginning in the 
early 2000s and extending through the present, neoliberals are chastened; there 
is a return to state-led projects and a retrenchment of the private; and the 
development community is engaged in critique. 69 Other, non-Western, critiques 
have also begun to emerge in the discourse. Scholars from the global South have 
emerged with "Third World Approaches to International Law," which question 
the foundations of international law and thus prior approaches to 
development. 70 Neoliberalism, though still dominant, is largely recognized as a 
failed approach to development. 71 The voices in this Third Moment also 
challenge the idea of a linear model of development largely based on a set of 
assumptions that presupposes limitless growth, a stable environment and 
resource base, and the advantages of privately led development. 72 
These three development moments are frequently cited to explain the 
chronology of development since World War II. The approach to development 
in each moment responds to the particular needs of the moment. For example, in 
the First Moment, developmental states were thought to be weak. Those 
engaged in development activity thus focused their efforts on strengthening the 
state and building institutional capacity. When this approach failed, in the 
Second Moment, the developmental state receded into the background to make 
way for private actors. Despite the presence of critique in the Third Moment, 
private actors are still a dominant presence in the realm of international 
development. From this broader international framing of Western-led 
approaches to international development, we turn to the United States. 
66. See Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 48, at 40--41. 
67. Trubek & Santos, supra note 50, at 6. 
68. See Gordon & Sylvester, supra note 48, at 40--43. 
69. Trubek & Santos, supra note 50, at 13. 
70. See Makau Mutua, What Is TWAIL?, 94 AM. SOC'y INT'L L. PROC. 31, 31 (2000) ("The 
regime of international law is illegitimate. It is a predatory system that legitimizes, reproduces and 
sustains the plunder and subordination of the Third World by the West.") (footnote omitted). 
71. See, e.g., Trubek & Santos, supra note 50, at 4-7 (suggesting that new approaches to 
development emerged after the Second Moment as a reaction to the failures of neoliberal policies). 
72. See, e.g., Mutua, supra note 70, at 37 (noting that "TWAIL embraces the project of 
subalternity, in which those who do not fit the frames of Eurocentrism and modernity can be heard 
and become full participants in their governance"); see also Usha Natarajan, TWAIL and the 
Environment: The State of Nature, the Nature of State, and the Arab Spring, 14 OR. REV. INT'L L. 177, 
195 (2012) (noting the movement of the Group of 77, a political coalition formed by the seventy-seven 
states from the global South who demanded "permanent sovereignty over natural resources as part of 
its effort to break away from colonial patterns of resource exploitation"). 
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B. The U.S. Development Moment 
In large part, the United States is excluded from the foregoing development 
discourse as a subject of development. However, just as it is for "developing" 
countries, economic growth is a critical theme in U.S. policy. The country is 
arguably now engaged in its own development moment. 
New economic, governance, and development issues have converged to 
create a new paradigm of risk and development. 73 Features of this moment 
include a destabilized middle class, socioeconomic inequality, challenges with 
respect to sustained and equitable economic growth, and extreme weather events 
that have the potential to disrupt and displace entire communities. The economic 
challenges are often traced to 2008, when the Western development gaze turned 
inward. 
Much of the scholarship and popular media coverage of the 2008 financial 
crisis focuses on its aftereffects. Although the financial crisis created a shock and 
prompted a soul-searching regarding regulatory failures, for many years the 
question of America's decline had lurked in the background.74 The middle class 
has long suffered from a number of policies that have raised concern regarding 
the long-term security of families; for those at the bottom, avenues to ascend the 
socioeconomic ladder are rapidly disappearing. This instability in the bottom 
99% of the country is in stark contrast to the extraordinary gains in wealth at the 
top.75 Indeed, as economist Robert J. Gordon argues with respect to the country 
at large, it has become increasingly difficult to generate wealth given that much 
of America's wealth resulted from one-time events, such as the discovery of 
fossil fuels. 76 This limitation on potential economic growth is a feature of the 
current development moment. 
In addition to the economic difficulties of this U.S. development moment, 
the United States is also grappling with unique climatic challenges. Recent years 
have revealed troubling climate trends. These trends include unprecedented and 
record-breaking weather patterns, including drought, flooding, and powerful 
tornadoes. Such trends may affect the country's ability to feed itself or keep 
73. Trubek & Santos, supra note 50, at 4. 
74. Robert J. Gordon, Is U.S. Economic Growth Over? Faltering Innovation Confronts the Six 
Headwinds 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18315, 2012) (commenting that 
"[t]he prospects for future long-run U.S. economic growth were already dismal in 2007 but were little 
noticed in the continuing euphoria over the invention of the Internet and the related developments in 
information technology and communications"). 
75. Chrystia Freeland, Looking for Capitalism's Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/17/us/17iht-letter17.html?_r=0 (noting that "one of the big economic 
facts of our time is the surge of income disparity, particularly between those at the very top and 
everyone else"). 
76. See Gordon, supra note 74, at 1-2 (arguing that economic growth since 1750 was the result 
of three industrial revolutions: (1) the inventions between 1750 and 1830 of the steam engine, cotton 
spinning, and railroad; (2) the inventions between 1870 and 1900 of electricity, the internal combustion 
engine, and running water with indoor plumbing; and (3) the computer and Internet revolution that 
began around 1960 and reached its apex in the late 1990s). 
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citizens safe. 77 They also add to the already unstable development backdrop of 
extremes, which renders choices about best approaches to economic 
development increasingly difficult. 
Deepening social and economic inequality, a declining middle class, 
limitations to economic growth, and uncertainty with respect to ecology are 
features of the current U.S. development moment. These features create the 
background against which development approaches are formulated. The 
foregoing background features are also arguably immutable; without substantial 
and aggressive policy innovations directed at their root causes, we cannot easily 
change them. In this new landscape, the field of development is more complex, 
more layered. The primary development actors are less easily classified as public 
or private, and the narratives associated with the First, Second, and Third 
Moments of development are not easy fits; the United States appears to be in 
unchartered waters of development. 
Moreover, in this development moment the risks associated with 
development appear exacerbated, more global, and systemic. For example, 
economic shocks in one part of the globe ripple through markets worldwide. 
Damaging environmental activities affect peoples on the opposite end of the 
planet. Yet, current methods of development appear to be happening 
haphazardly, disconnectedly, and in isolation. Fracking is one such method. 
These seemingly isolated development efforts share common threads. They fall 
within an approach to development in this moment that this Article calls 
"hybridity. " 
III. HYBRIDITY: AN ApPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT 
This Article introduces a new term into the development lexicon: hybridity. 
If the context of the current development moment is characterized by extremes, 
hybridity is the extreme approach to development utilized with frequency in this 
moment. Like developmental state capacity building in the first development 
moment and neoliberalism in the second, hybridity is the dominant approach to 
development in the current moment. 78 Under a hybrid approach, private actors 
are engaged in economic development activity with little to no oversight or 
regulation. Many of the transactions engaged in during this development 
moment also entail a great amount of systemic financial, social, and 
environmental risk, while yielding ever fewer benefits.79 In sum, risky, 
unregulated, and complex technologies are deployed by private actors utilizing 
77. See, e.g., Carmen G. Gonzalez, Climate Change, Food Security, and Agrobiodiversity: 
Toward A Just, Resilient, and Sustainable Food System, 22 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 493, 511 (2011) 
(discussing food security and how extreme weather patterns can affect global food supplies). 
78. See supra Part ILA for a discussion of the policies associated with the three development 
moments. 
79. See Gordon, supra note 74, at 16--18 (noting that among the six "daunting headwinds that 
will limit future potential growth" are rising inequality and efforts to cope with carbon emissions in the 
face of a declining environment). 
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public goods, transacting within opaque or nonexistent regulatory frameworks, 
and creating systemic risk. This is hybridity. 
Hybridity has long been used as a critical and disruptive term to describe 
complex phenomena that are not easily explained, or to pull together disparate 
ideologies. 8o In this Article, hybridity is introduced as a part of the development 
lexicon to describe a prevalent approach to development during the current U.S. 
development moment. This approach pulls together aspects of private autonomy 
and public power, and involves a complexity that breeds systemic risk. 
Parts lILA and m.B explain the key features of hybridity-(l) private 
activity within a regulatory vacuum, (2) private activity that pervasively touches 
upon public goods, and (3) systemic risk-as reflected through two recent events, 
the financial crisis of 2008 and the BP oil spill. Part m.c then turns to fracking 
specifically and argues that it also reflects a hybrid approach to development. 
A. Hybridity: Private, Poorly Regulated Activity 
With hybridity, the regulatory structure is often thin, if it even exists at all. 
Development subject to a hybridity approach often involves novel technology. 
Indeed, the technology of the activity makes it appear prone to a lack of 
regulation. Industry insiders supply regulators to regulate the industry, provide 
regulators with a regulatory framework, or the industry is expected to regulate 
itself. The financial crisis and the BP oil spill provide apt examples. Each 
industry eluded regulation due to the complexity and sophistication of the 
technologies deployed therein. 
1. The Financial Crisis - A Regulatory Crisis 
The financial crisis involved the use of novel financial technology that had 
developed beyond the capacity of the U.S. financial regulatory system. In the 
lead up to the financial crisis of 2008, mortgage originators-banks-made loans 
to borrowers whose credentials normally would not suggest creditworthiness. 
80. The term "hybridity" has also recently emerged within several streams of legal scholarship. 
Within the global pluralism literature, hybridity is used to locate the governed in a frame of 
overlapping legal orders. Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155, 1164 
(2007) (using "hybridity" to describe the multiple legal regimes to which an individual may be subject); 
Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. 
REV. 375, 403 (2008) (using "hybridity" to describe the complexity of individuals within a governance 
framework). New governance scholars have also utilized the term to describe a marriage of competing 
ideologies, how individuals and institutions experience governance, and how governance 
methodologies (both international and domestic) operate. David M. Trubek, Patrick Cottrell & Mark 
Nance, "Soft Law," "Hard Law," and European Integration: Toward a Theory of Hybridity 4 
(University of Wisconsin Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper No. 1002, Nov. 
2005), available at http://ssrn.com!abstract=855447 (describing the mix of hard and soft law as 
hybridity). Within the area of energy law, hybridity both describes and prescribes mechanisms for 
governance and innovation surrounding the country's most pressing energy issues. See Hari M. 
Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD. L. REV. 773, 840-43 (2013) 
[hereinafter Osofsky & Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism] (defining hybrid institutions as those 
"that combine authority from more than one source, whether as a formal or informal part of their 
structure or governance process"). 
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The banks overcame these credit limitations by providing so-called liar loans to 
individuals with high-risk profiles. 81 With "liar loans," documentation that might 
provide information about a borrower's risk profile was simply not provided. 
The information required was inadequate or simply nonexistent. 82 What is well 
known now is that this limited documentation process led to the proliferation of 
risky loans, known as subprime mortgages. 83 
The interest rates on subprime mortgages were also problematic. Borrowers 
were initially enticed into mortgages by low, but adjustable, mortgage rates. 
These rates would eventually balloon, making the borrower's ability to pay 
difficult, if not impossible. Given that many of the borrowers provided with liar 
loans were low-income individuals, once the mortgage interest rate on the loan 
was adjusted to the market, borrowers were unable to meet their monthly 
mortgage obligations, and eventually defaulted. The potential for this occurrence 
was widely known and understood within the industry, and the banking industry 
developed a mechanism to avoid carrying the risk. 
The mechanism involved a complex set of players and multiple processes. 
Mortgage originators that initiated the loans to high-risk borrowers immediately 
sold the loans to other banks.84 The receiving bank then securitized the 
mortgage by slicing the income stream from the mortgage into multiple income 
streams and combining these individuated income streams with other income 
streams. The process, known in the industry as securitization,85 was designed to 
minimize the risk associated with any particular loan by combining it with other 
81. See Skip Kaltenheuser, A Letter from Washington, IBA GLOBAL INSIGHT, no. 3, 2011, at 12, 
12 (noting that "in 2006 between a quarter and a half of home loans were 'liars' loans,' for which the 
great majority involved fraud" and, moreover, banks "supplied the overwhelming number of lies"); 
Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation Failed to Prevent the 
CDO Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1394 (2009) (defining liar loans as those 
in which "mortgage originators did not ask for, or did not review, their borrowers' documentation and 
winked at incredible representations of ability to pay"); David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1845 (2013) (describing "liar mortgages" as one of the key factors exacerbating 
the financial crisis of 2008). 
82. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE 
WORLD ECONOMY 78 (2010) (discussing "no-doc" mortgages that required little to no reporting of 
income or assets prior to approval). 
83. See Daniel Lindsey, Prevent People from Wrongfully Losing Their Homes, CBA REC., Ocl. 
2007, at 38 (describing subprime mortgage loans as "high-cost loans marketed to homeowners with 
impaired credit" and that the "expansion of these products has been equally aggressive as lenders have 
pushed into ever more exotic territory: stated income loans, interest-only mortgages, option 
ARMs .... [which) inviters) fraud"). Lindsey further notes that "subprime lending rose from a modest 
$35 billion in 1994 to over $600 billion in 2006." [d. 
84. STIGLITZ, supra note 82, at 79 (describing the way in which mortgage originators had 
incentives to originate as many mortgages as they could, and that "[t]he securitization process 
supported never-ending fees, the never-ending fees supported unprecedented profits, and the 
unprecedented profits generated unheard-of bonuses, ... [which] blinded the bankers"). 
85. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAl. CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 543 (2011) (defining "securitization" as the "[p]rocess of pooling debt assets 
such as mortgages, car loans, and credit card debt into a separate legal entity that then issues a new 
financial instrument or security for sale to investors"). 
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loan products and into mortgage pools and so-called collateralized debt 
instruments.86 Unfortunately, the banks did not properly track the risks 
contained in the combined instruments. 87 Even more unfortunate, the Federal 
Reserve, the agency in charge of regulating mortgage-lending standards, did not 
properly set lending standards.88 Further, the securities ratings agencies, charged 
with the public mandate of informing the trading public of risks with securities 
instruments, failed to identify the risks associated with the securitized 
mortgages. 89 Finally, the banking industry spent billions to secure its position as 
an unregulated industry heavily embedded within the American political 
system. 90 
The foregoing lending activity was conducted in the name of development. 
In the current widespread efforts to bring to account the private actors who took 
extraordinary risks within the public sphere, this perspective is sometimes lost. 
Indeed, some narratives describing the lead up to the financial crisis point to 
specific efforts by the George W. Bush administration to bring more low- and 
middle-income Americans into the so-called ownership society. 91 These 
Americans suffered immensely under the Bush administration's economic 
policies, and providing a promise of home ownership-made possible by 
increasing the liquidity in markets-would presumably placate a restive 
population, generate increased overall wealth, and lead to economic growth. 92 
Unfortunately, rather than force the banks to privatize their risks by deploying 
regulatory mechanisms that increased the transaction costs of their activities, the 
banks were permitted to socialize their risk. The consequences of this policy 
choice were far-reaching. 
2. Deep-Sea Drilling - Regulatory Capture 
The deep-sea drilling regulatory narrative mirrors the financial crisis. Prior 
to the April 20, 2010, explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon oil rig that 
resulted in the deaths of eleven people and untold environmental and social 
harm to the fragile Gulf of Mexico region, regulation of offshore drilling had not 
86. See id. at 539 (defining "collateralized debt obligations" as a "[t]ype of security often 
composed of the riskier portions of mortgage-backed securities"). 
87. As the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the 
United States notes, the risky mortgages were everywhere. "Trillions of dollars in risky mortgages had 
become embedded throughout the financial system, as mortgage-related securities were packaged, 
repackaged, and sold to investors around the world," which led to global exposure to financial risk. Id. 
at xvi. 
88. /d. at xvii. 
89. See id. at 43-44, 118 (discussing the difficulty ratings agencies had with rating bundled 
securities, and that investment banks paid the ratings agencies to obtain favorable ratings). 
90. See id. at xviii (noting that between 1999 and 2008, the financial industry spent $2.7 billion to 
lobby politicians, and individuals within the industry spent more than $1 billion in political campaign 
contributions ). 
91. See RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: How HIDDEN FRACfURES STILL THREATEN THE 
WORLD ECONOMY 37 (2010). 
92. See id. at 43 (noting that providing access to credit was a way to mitigate perceived 
inequality). 
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kept apace with the technology.93 The technology utilized in Deepwater Horizon 
was largely untested at the depths deployed in the rig; the regulation and 
enforcement of such technology was also lacking. 94 Moreover, as subsequent 
government-sponsored analyses of the spill reveal, the industry had also fallen 
prey to regulatory capture. 95 
Many of these failings were structural. As described in the 2011 report to 
the President-issued by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling-the Minerals Management Service, the 
federal agency charged with overseeing oceanic drilling, was also created to 
expand the industry, an inherent conflict of interest. 96 Moreover, deepwater 
drilling technology and the changing nature of the drilling industry outpaced 
regulations. 97 Thus, the agency could not properly oversee, manage, and enforce 
the risks of the industry. As documented by the task force that reported on the 
Deepwater Horizon explosion and subsequent spill, this inability to regulate 
proved fatal. 98 
B. Hybridity: Engagement with Public Goods 
In the field of economic development, engagement with public goods is not 
a new phenomenon. Indeed, many extractive industries require water and other 
natural resources for their operations. With respect to hybridity, however, actors 
are not merely utilizing a public good, they are relying on public goods in a 
pervasive manner. Hybridity is not isolated to a particular region, it is 
ubiquitous. The riskiness of the enterprise makes this ubiquity particularly 
problematic. 99 Moreover, the lack of regulation and sophisticated attenuation of 
risk deployed by such actors exacerbates the potential harm that may arise from 
93. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE DRILLING, 
DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FuTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT vii (2011) [hereinafter BP COMM'N). 
94. Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Applying Some Lessons from the Gulf Oil Spill to Hydraulic 
Fracturing, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1279, 1280 (2013) (noting that "regulation and enforcement had 
not kept pace with the advances in technology" in the field of deep-sea drilling). 
95. BP COMM'N, supra note 93, at 28 (noting that federal oversight of the oil drilling industry 
"followed the philosophy of 'minimum regulation, maximum cooperation,'" and that close 
relationships between government and industry led to a lack of accountability); see also Robertson, 
supra, note 94, at 1281 (noting conflict between the Minerals Management Service and the industry 
"that made it virtually impossible for the agency to function rationally to prevent the disaster"). 
96. BP COMM'N, supra note 93, at 56. 
97. Id. at 73. 
98. Id. (discussing how the inherent tension between the environmental protection mandate and 
drive for energy independence led to a regulatory lapse); see also Robertson, supra note 94, at 1286 
(discussing the conflict among the Minerals Management Service's leasing. revenue collection, and 
permitting functions and noting that "the agency ... would not have the incentive to make sound 
leasing or enforcement decisions that might be in conflict with its revenue-raising goals"). 
99. See Hannah Wiseman, Fracturing Regulation Applied, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 361, 
365 (2012) (noting that fracturing expands the familiar risks associated with drilling, such as the risk 
that "fluids and muds may spill on the surface of well pads, produced water may spill during transfer 
or leak from a surface pit," and "[i]rnproperly cased wells may also leak methane at the drilling stage, 
causing methane to migrate into soil and water sources" because it "enable[es] more development"). 
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reliance on a public good. With hybridity, private actors become free riders in 
this tragedy of the commons scenario, whereby none of the actors is incentivized 
to mind the greater commons even as it diminishes. 100 
With hybrid development, private actors go big in order to increase a 
return. 101 This requires more engagement with public resources, which 
ultimately creates more risk.102 This analogy appears no more apt than in the 
context of our two hybrid development examples. 
1. Undermining the Financial Market 
The second feature of hybridity, routine engagement with public goods, 
features prominently in the financial crisis example. The economic theory 
literature treats public goods as goods that are (1) nonrival and (2) 
nonexcludable. 103 Nonrival means that the enjoyment of the good by one party 
does not infringe on another person's ability to enjoy it (national defense is often 
cited as an example ).104 Nonexcludable means that one party's enjoyment of the 
good does not infringe on another party's enjoyment (again, national defense 
provides a good example). 105 From an environmental perspective, air, water, and 
space fall within the definition of public goods. Arguably, the term applies to the 
financial market. The financial market is nonrival, in that persons may freely 
participate in the market without infringing on another party's right to enjoy it. 
Moreover, it is nonexcludable, meaning that one person's engagement with the 
market does not limit another person's ability to engage in market activity. The 
financial crisis devastated the financial market, one of the most precious public 
goods in the global economy. 
The risky, unregulated activity that led to the financial crisis greatly 
diminished the financial markets by reducing confidence in the integrity of the 
markets.106 Individuals could no longer trust that the companies, markets, and 
industries in which they were investing were not infected by the toxic mortgage 
100. Finance scholar Steven L. Schwarcz' has explored this phenomenon in the context of 
financial regulation. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.1. 193, 197-98 (2008) (arguing 
that systemic risk should be regulated because within the context of the financial market, none of the 
market participants has an incentive to limit risk taking to decrease the systemic dangers to other 
market participants and third parties). 
101. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical 
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1349, 1378-79 (2011) (noting that, "[nlot surprisingly, then, 
when past financial crises recede in memory, investors always 'go for the gold,' in the sense of seeking 
higher rates of return in lieu of protection from risk"). 
102. See Sara Gosman, Reflecting Risk: Chemical Disclosure and Hydraulic Fracturing, 48 GA. 
L. REV. 83, 88 (2013) (noting that the scale of chemical activity accompanying the modern fracking 
boom raises questions regarding long-term environmental and health effects). 
103. See, e.g., Justin M. Ross, What Should Policy Makers Know When Economists Say "Market 
Failure?", 14 GEO. PUB. POL'y REV. 27, 30 (2009) (discussing classic economic definition of public 
goods). 
104. See Arunan Arulampalam, Note, Obamacare's Co-ops: The "Charter Schools" of 
Healthcare, 17 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J.105, 114-15 (2013). 
105. Id. 
106. See supra Part 1I1.A.l for a discussion of the 2008 financial crisis. 
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instruments of the subprime mortgage industry. In a sense, the market seemed 
damaged beyond repair. 
Hundreds of pension and retirement funds had invested heavily in the 
financial markets, leading to the disappearance of the nest eggs of millions of 
Americans literally overnight. 107 Also, given that private parties-in this case 
managers within the banking industry-have no duty to remedy public harms, 
the government emerged to stop the bleeding. In its efforts to restabilize the 
financial markets and to reassure consumers that the markets were once again 
safe, the government-the taxpayers writ large-bailed out the banking industry. 
The bailout led to the greatest transfer of wealth ever witnessed in the history of 
the United States 108 and incalculable damage to the public. 
2. BP: Utilizing the World's Most Ubiquitous Public Good 
For three months, the world watched via live streaming video nearly five 
million gallons of oil gush into the Gulf of Mexico, an already fragile ecosystem 
damaged by decades of drilling.109 The Gulf's waters serve as a planetary 
resource and provide a key foundation to the livelihoods of millions of people 
living along the Gulf Coast. The effects of the spill reverberated through the 
oceans, affecting marine life, water quality, and the public's access to clean 
water; but perhaps even more devastatingly, the spill altered the cultural and 
economic life within the region-both of which rely on the health of the Gulf-
for the foreseeable future. 110 
One year after the disaster, Louisiana shrimpers reported significant dips in 
the volume of shrimp. Some shrimpers even ventured that the season 
immediately following the spill might have been the worst in memory. 111 Two 
years after the disaster, scientists indicated that most of the oil in the Gulf had 
evaporated, had been consumed by bacteria, or had dispersed in the deep Gulf 
water. 112 The Gulf's resiliency notwithstanding, real concerns remain, and 
107. Danny Hakim, Cities Borrow from Pensions to Pay for Them, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,2012, at 
Al (noting losses to pension funds in the 2008 financial crisis); see also Gretchen Morgenson, New 
York Looks into Banks' Role in Fiscal Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2011, at AI. 
108. Joseph Stiglitz makes this point in Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the 
World Economy, "As I anticipated when the bailouts began, this has turned out to be one of the largest 
redistributions of wealth in such a short period of time in history." STIGLITZ, supra note 82, at 200; see 
also Gretchen Morgenson, Enriching the Few at the Expense of Many, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2011, at 
B1. 
109. BP COMM'N, supra note 93, at x. 
110. See Leslie Kaufman, Gulf Studies Yield More than Damage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12,2011, at 
D1 (stating that while scientists are examining data to understand the impact of the spill, the 
complexity of the Gulf ecosystem makes exact calculations difficult); David Segal, Should the Money 
Go Where the Oil Didn't?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at BU1 (noting the spill affected areas even 
where oil did not make landfall); Stephen Teague, Shirking Responsibility in the Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 31, 2013, at A21 (noting that thousands of low-wage workers have struggled to make ends meet 
after the spill). 
111. Campbell Robertson, Gulf Shrimp Are Scarce This Season; Answers, Too, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 10, 2011, at A16. 
112. Editorial. The Big Spill, Two Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2012, at A26. 
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scientists recognize that "oil has poisoned Louisiana's salt marshes and wetlands, 
which are vital fish nurseries, and visibly damaged deep-sea coral."113 
Moreover, the true toll on the Gulf and its complex marine environment 
may not be known for many years. 114 At the three-year mark, the Gulf was still 
suffering the effects of the spill. Although BP had already paid $14 billion in 
cleanup costs and $6.3 billion in damages to various individuals and businesses 
(with $7.8 billion pledged and foreseeable damages under the Oil Pollution Act 
and Clean Water Act),115 environmental groups, including the Environmental 
Defense Fund, the National Audubon Society, the Lake Pontchartrain Basin 
Foundation, the Gulf Restoration Network, and the Sierra Club said, in a 
statement, "Three years later, the oil spill is still a living disaster with ongoing 
effects, many of which will remain unknown for decades to come. "116 
C. Hybridity: Systemic Risk 
As hinted at above, hybridity also entails a great deal of unchecked risk. 
These created risks routinely flow through to third parties, including the public. 
With the financial crisis, firms' individually risky behavior led to a cumulative 
systemic risk. As Professor Schwarcz describes economic systemic risk, it is 
the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional 
failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of 
a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to 
financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or 
decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-
market price volatility. 117 
In other words, one failure within a connected web of institutions or a system can 
lead to a chain reaction. 
1. The Financial Crisis: Systemic Risk in the Financial System 
In Regulating Systemic Risk, Professors Anabtawi and Schwarcz go beyond 
the definitional question of systemic risk to the issue of regulating it, and argue 
that the underlying causes of systemic risk must be addressed in order to regulate 
it. They theorize that the causes of systemic risk relate to two correlations: (1) a 
low-probability event, and (2) a failure to recognize the interconnectedness of 
the financial system. liB This systemic risk was certainly realized through the 
113. /d. 
114. Id. 
115. Id.; see also Kevin McGill, BP Is Liable for Clean Water Act Damages from Gulf Oil Spill, 
Appeals Court Reaffirms, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2015, 5:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2014/11/06/bp-liable-gulf-spill_n_6115430.html (discussing the Fifth Circuit's opinion in In re 
Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014), which upheld the certification of a class of plaintiffs 
suing BP for its involvement in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill). 
116. Richard Thompson, BP Oil Spill Trial Continues as Demonstrators Note Upcoming 3-Year 
Anniversary of Disaster, NOLA.COM (Apr. 16,2013,7:03 PM), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/ 
index.ssf/2013/04/bp_oil_spill_draws_demonstrato.html. 
117. Schwarcz, supra note 100, at 204. 
118. Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 101, at 1353. 
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domino effect of the crisis, but Anabtawi and Schwarcz suggest that unsuspecting 
financial institutions laid the foundation of the financial crisis by engaging in 
incrementally risky behavior. These institutions inadequately accounted for the 
impact of low-probability events, such as widespread defaults on risky 
mortgages; moreover, the institutions were unaware of the linkages among firms 
who were engaged in risky lending activity or doing business with such lenders. 
As Anabtawi and Schwarcz describe, "In under-appreciating their 
interconnections to other institutions, financial market participants take on 
socially excessive risk levels that increase the fragility of the financial system."119 
A second, less-obvious, and perhaps under-recognized, risk created by the 
transactions was the risk that entire communities would become blighted and 
devastated by a cascade of foreclosures. The blight that resulted from the 
foreclosures rocked communities, leading to a diminishment of the tax base and 
losses to public services. The destabilization of the financial markets also made it 
difficult for small businesses to stay afloat. The markets were skittish, and the 
biggest of the bailed-out banks became squeamish about lending. Thus, 
communities across the United States were doubly affected by the financial 
crisis. First, the foreclosures created by subprime mortgage defaults led to blight; 
and second, the disinvestment by businesses unable to obtain capital to meet 
business needs, including hiring employees, deepened unemployment. The fabric 
within the interconnected web of community and capital began to fray.120 
2. BP: Systemic Risk in a Complex System 
In the words of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (Commission), the entire enterprise that led to 
the Deepwater Horizon explosion was "dazzling"; at the time of the explosion, 
the Deepwater Horizon was already drilling the Macondo oil well beneath five 
thousand feet of Gulf of Mexico water and from there, over thirteen thousand 
feet under the sea floor to the oil reservoir below. 121 The mile of seawater 
separating the ocean floor from the Deepwater Horizon exists as part of the most 
ubiquitous public good known to man-the ocean. Although the seas have 
always been a resource for private parties, deep-sea drilling marks a change: the 
depth and complexity of deep-sea drilling increase the overall risk of failure of 
the operation. Indeed, the Commission made several important conclusions 
regarding risk and complexity. 
The study concludes: "Deepwater energy exploration and production, 
particularly at the frontiers of experience, involve risks for which neither 
industry nor government has been adequately prepared, but for which they can 
119. [d. at 1355. 
120. Indeed, as the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report notes, the home is the cornerstone of 
stability in America. It is a "building block of community and social life. . . . Homes are the 
foundation upon which many of our social, personal, governmental, and economic structures rest. ... 
[From schools to public services,] [d]ownturns in the housing industry can cause ripple effects almost 
everywhere." FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 85, at 4. 
121. BP COMM'N, supra note 93, at viii. 
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and must be prepared in the future." 122 Moreover, citing the investigation of the 
Columbia space shuttle disaster of the 1980s, the Commission notes, "complex 
systems almost always fail in complex ways." 123 
In March of 2008, BP purchased rights to drill the Mississippi Canyon Block 
252, a nine-square-mile plot in the Gulf of Mexico. 124 The Macondo was to be its 
first well under the new lease with the Minerals Management Service, for which 
BP paid a little bit over $34 million.125 The structure of the operation was 
complex. Although BP was the operator for activities on Block 252, it neither 
owned nor operated the rigs respons.ible for the drilling enterprise. A group of 
specialized contractors would do the work of drilling the well, following the 
design specifications of BP's Houston-based engineering team. 126 The web of 
complexity became even denser, as BP used the Deepwater Horizon rig, which 
was owned by a separate company, Transocean, to drill the Macondo well. 127 Yet 
another company, Halliburton, was responsible for ensuring proper casing of the 
well. As the Commission concludes, the cumulative risk resulting from errors 
across the public and private actors responsible for the rig became so great that 
the risk of catastrophic blowout was realized. 128 The root cause of the explosion 
was systemic, "rooted in systemic failures by industry management," namely, 
poor communication and coordination among the multiple actors responsible for 
the well. 129 
According to the Commission, the accident was avoidable. The ripple 
effects of the disaster were immediate. Local businesses immediately suffered 
from cancelled reservations and decreased business. 130 Dead birds and other 
marine wildlife washed ashore covered in oil. 131 And, perhaps the most painful 
domino to fall, a culture reliant on the health of the fragile Gulf ruptured. 132 
D. Fracking in the Gray Zone 
Fracking presents a classic example of the development approach of 
hybridity in the current U.S. development moment. Fracking is not simply a 
method of extracting gas; it is economic development activity. It is undertaken 
122. [d. at vii. 
123. [d. at viii (internal quotation marks omitted). 
124. [d. at 89. 
125. [d. 
126. [d. at 92. 
127. [d. 
128. [d. at l15. 
129. [d. at 122. 
130. See id. at 155 (explaining the impact of the BP oil spill on a business that coordinated 
weddings on the Gulf Coast). 
131. [d. at 173-75 (noting that President Obama referred to the BP oil spill as the "worst 
environmental disaster America has ever faced"; effects on animals and marine life throughout the 
water column and entire ecosystem are still being measured). 
132. See id. at 163 (noting the demise of an oyster distributor that had been continuously 
operating for 134 years after the oil spill-one of many businesses impacted by the oil spill according 
to the Commission). 
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by private entities, subject to a patchwork regulatory framework, and it contains 
many of the unwieldy features of both the financial crisis and the BP oil spill that 
give rise to systemic risk. Fracking should be located within a larger theoretical 
framework of increasingly risky development that incorporates the features of 
hybridity. This Part explores this assertion beginning with an overview of the 
fracking methodology. 
1. A Fracking Primer 
Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, involves the injection of a combination of 
water, chemicals, and sand into the earth to release natural gas. The natural gas 
subject to this state-of-the-art drilling process is also sometimes referred to as 
"unconventional" or "tight." The gas is found "in geologically complex, 
nonconventional reservoirs such as tight (low-permeability) sands, gas-bearing 
shales and coalbeds."133 Extracting this unconventional gas requires an 
unconventional means, such as hydraulic fracturing. 134 
Fracking drills can run vertically for thousands of feet, and horizontally for 
several thousand feet. Multiple wells can also be drilled from a single well pad. 
Once the drilling of a well is complete, a proprietary cocktail of chemicals and 
sand is pumped into the well at high pressures, "which pushes through 
perforations in the horizontal well bore, fracturing the shale and releasing the 
natural gas for recovery."135 After the fracking process, the fracking fluid, known 
as "flowback" or "produced water," returns to the surface. 136 
For some communities, the fracking process has produced a set of 
particularly problematic environmental, social, and economic outcomes, and the 
harmful potential effects of fracking have already been realized. 137 The trillions 
133. Kathryn J. Brasier et aI., Residents' Perceptions of Community and Environmental Impacts 
from Development of Natural Gas in the Marcellus Shale: A Comparison of Pennsylvania and New 
York Cases, J. RURAL SOc. SCI., no. I, 2011, at 33 n.1, available at http://www.ag.auburn.edu/ 
auxiliarylsrsaipages/Articles/JRSS%202011 %202611IJRSS%202011 %2026%201 %2032-61.pdf 
134. Id. at 32-33. 
135. Nancy D. Perkins, The Fracturing of Place: The Regulation of Marcellus Shale Development 
and the Subordination of Local Experience, 23 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 44, 48-49 (2012). 
136. Id. 
137. See Daniel Gilbert, Exxon Chief Joins Lawsuit Raising Ruckus Over Fracking, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 21, 2014, at B1 (stating that even Exxon CEO does not want fracking-related water towers near 
his home); see also TONY DUTZIK, ELIZABETH RIDLINGTON & JOHN RUMPLER, ENVIRONMENT 
NORTH CAROLINA RESEARCH & POLICY CENTER, THE COSTS OF FRACKING: THE PRICE TAG OF 
DIRTY DRILLING'S ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE I, 25 (2012), available at http://www.wral.com/ 
assetinews/state/nccapito1l2012/09/20111571598IThe_Costs_oCFrackin~ vNC.pdf (examining costs to 
clean up air and water pollution and road damage in Pennsylvania, Arkansas, and Colorado, ranging 
from $109,000 to $265 million per instance evaluated); Kevin Begos, 4 States Confirm Water Pollution 
from Drilling, USA TODAY (Jan. 5, 2014, 5:20 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/ 
business/2014/01/05/some-states-confirm-water-pollution-from-drilling/43288591 (concluding after an 
examination of complaints concerning drilling-related water pollution that "hundreds of complaints 
have been made about well-water contamination from oil or gas drilling, and pollution was confirmed 
in a number of them"); Dan Boyce, Booming Oil Fields May Be Giving Sex Trafficking a Boost, NPR 
(Feb. I, 2014, 4:55 AM), http://www.npr.org/2014/02/01/265698046/booming-oil-fields-may-be-giving-
sex-trafficking-a-boost (quoting a Montana law enforcement official on the way the oil field boom 
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of cubic feet of natural gas stored in the various shale deposits around the 
country make fracking more than a blip on the development screen. 138 Indeed, 
fracking is already proving to be game changing. 139 
2. Fracking as Hybridity: Opacity Within a Regulatory Vacuum 
Of the legal critiques of fracking that have emerged, the dearth of a proper 
regulatory mechanism is perhaps the most common. 140 Currently, no 
comprehensive regulatory regime exists.141 The private aspects of fracking allow 
fracking developers to avail themselves of the trade secret protections of private 
law, even as their activities routinely affect the public. 142 This opacity induces 
anxiety in communities debating whether to permit or ban fracking. This Part 
explores the origins of these regulatory challenges, and concludes that the nature 
of fracking, like deep-sea oil drilling and the suite of technologies deployed 
before the 2008 financial crisis, makes it difficult to regulate. 
With respect to location, fracking occurs on all types of land. It occurs on 
federal, Native American, state, and private lands. 143 To get access to these 
boosts sex trafficking: "[Montana Department of Justice, Division of Criminal Investigation 
Administrator Bryan] Lockerby knows the oil boom in his state and in neighboring North Dakota 
means economic opportunities for organized crime. 'Guns, drugs, prostitution-all of that goes hand in 
hand,' he says."); Cathy Dyson, Activists Shine Light on Fracking, FREDERICKSBURG. COM (Nov. 27, 
2014, 4:19 PM), http://www.fredericksburg.comlnews/activists-shine-Iight-on-fracking/article_91e95d1 
d-fS27-58de-98a6-79bb72c3e84S.html (discussing impact of fracking on a West Virginia town and the 
efforts of activist groups to expose the deterioration in the town's quality of life); Paul Thares, Oil & 
Gas Development: The Effects on Community Development (Part 3), IGRow (June 19, 2013), 
http://igrow.org/community-developmentlcommunities/oil-gas-development-the-effects-on-community 
-development-part-31 (discussing loss of available pool of workers, housing shortages, damage to 
roads, increased traffic). 
138. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., No. 03883, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2014 WITH 
PROJECTIONS TO 2040, at 23 (2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2014).pdf 
(estimating that there was 9.7 trillion cubic feet of shale gas produced in 2012). 
139. Timothy Fitzgerald, Frackonomics: Some Economics of Hydraulic Fracturing, 63 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1337, 1346 (2013) (noting that the increase in the domestic natural gas reserve base has 
sometimes been referred to as the "natural gas revolution") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
140. See David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy 
Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 434-35 (2013) (discussing current regulatory debate). 
141. This may be exacerbated by the fact that fracking is permitted on state, federal, Native 
American, and private land. In fact, one fracking operation may encompass a combination of public 
and private lands. See infra note 143. 
142. See Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 320 
P.3d 222, 225-28 (Wyo. 2014) (providing an example in which a fracking company opposed regulations 
that required disclosure of fracking compounds by invoking trade secret protections). 
143. See James William Gibson, Fracking Boom in North Dakota Has Heavy Impact on Native 
Americans, ECOWATCH (Dec. 6, 2012 12:12 pm), http://ecowatch.coml2012/12/06/fracking-impacts-
native-americansl (noting the presence of fracking on Native American land); see also Katharine Q. 
Seelye, Gas Drillers Invade Hunters' Pennsylvania Paradise, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,2011, at A12 (noting 
the presence of fracking on state land); Mark Drajem, Scaled-Back U.S. Fracking Rule Draws 
Qualified Praise, BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2013-05-
16/fracking-on-federal-lands-said-to-get-scaled-back-rule-proposal.html (noting the presence of 
fracking on federal lands); Dyson, supra note 137 (noting the presence of drilling on private land). 
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lands, private gas companies contract with public entities, such as state or federal 
agencies, or private individuals,l44 to obtain access to land for drilling. In 
addition to the standard drilling permit required to commence drilling 
operations, some municipal and state governments have added an additional 
step, requiring developers to obtain permits or to go through a public hearing 
process prior to drilling activity.145 Other states and localities permit developers 
to approach landowners directly and initiate the fracking process purely through 
a private contractual process. 146 In yet another variation, developers desiring to 
drill on federal, state, or Native American land are subject to specific 
requirements based on the type of land on which drilling activity is proposed. 147 
Given that fracking can occur virtually anywhere, absent an explicit restriction, 
comprehensive regulation is challenging at best. A veritable patchwork quilt of 
regulation thus emerges. 148 
Fracking benefits from what is commonly referred to as the Halliburton 
Loophole. 149 Oil and gas are typically regulated at the state level, but the oil and 
gas industry lobbied hard for exemptions from several key federal laws, 
including: (1) the Safe Drinking Water Act, which mandates federal regulation 
of underground injection activities to protect ground water; (2) the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, a comprehensive regulatory framework for 
managing hazardous waste; and (3) the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act, which was enacted to regulate the storage, release, and 
144. Fracking may also involve a split lease, wherein a private owner leases access to a 
developer to extract federally owned minerals. Fracking companies typically enter into lease 
arrangements and agree to provide either a flat payment or royalty payments to the lessor in 
connection with the lease. During the lease term, the companies engage in the process of natural gas 
extraction. See ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 27, at 27-30 (discussing fee and leasing arrangements 
between landowners and drillers). 
145. See 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3211(b) (2014) (requiring drillers in Pennsylvania to provide 
notice to surrounding municipalities, landowners, and lessees, who have fifteen days to contest the 
well, and include proof of that notice in their permit application); Eleanor Black, Fracking Makes Its 
Debut in Illinois Under Strictest Regulatory Laws in the US, DAILY ILLINI (Oct. 24, 2013), hup:llm. 
dailyillini.comlnewsllocallarticle3cff98ce-3c55-11e3-8440-001a4bcf6878.html?mode=jqm (noting that 
Illinois requires pre- and post-drilling water testing to qualify for permits). 
146. See Ian Urbina, Jeremy Ashkenas & Jo Craven McGinty, Drilling Down: Oil and Gas 
Leases, N.Y. TIMES, hUp:llwww.nytimes.comiinteractive/2011112/02/us/oil-and-gas-leases.html (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2015) (providing a collection of 111,000 private oil and gas contracts in Texas, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia). 
147. See NAT'L PARKS CONSERVATION ASS'N CTR. FOR PARKS RESEARCH, NATIONAL PARKS 
AND HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: BALANCING ENERGY NEEDS, NATURE, AND AMERICA'S NATIONAL 
HERITAGE 27 (2013), available at hUp:/Iwww.npca.orgiassets/pdflFracking",Report.pdf (explaining that 
Bureau of Land Management must consult with National Park Service if drilling is near national 
parks); see also Qs&As About Oil and Gas Leasing, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF LAND 
MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/wo/st!enJprog/energy/oil_and~as/questions_and_answers.html (last 
updated July 10,2012) (outlining the Bureau of Land Management process for obtaining leases on 
federal land). 
148. NATHAN RICHARDSON, MADELINE GOTTLIEB, ALAN KRUPNICK & HANNAH WISEMAN, 
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, THE STATE OF STATE SHALE GAS REGULATION 87--88 (2013) (noting 
regulatory heterogeneity among the thirty-one states examined in study). 
149. See Editorial, The Halliburton Loophole, N.Y. DMES, Nov. 3, 2009, at A28. 
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transfer of hazardous and toxic chemicals. 150 Moreover, the sheer scope and 
complexity of fracking activity, where each operator uses a different combination 
of chemicals in small amounts,151 make it an uneasy fit within any number of 
existing chemical disclosure regimes. 152 Although fracking is subject to the 
discharge provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA),153 which govern the 
discharge of fracking water to surface waters,154 the oil and gas industry is 
exempted from the CW A's provisions concerning storm runoff. 155 Thus, an 
operator of an oil or gas construction, exploration, processing, and treatment 
facility is under no obligation to minimize contamination of soil or sediment 
washed away by storm water collected or conveyed within its operations. 156 The 
substantial regulatory gaps and opacity concerning the chemicals used in the 
fracking process raise concerns. The nation's environmental watchdog, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), is currently in the process of 
conducting a comprehensive study of fracking's potential impacts on drinking 
water. 157 The EPA has compiled several reports on its findings, the latest of 
which was released in July 2014, but more reports and articles based on the 
study's findings are expected. 158 While awaiting more findings, the states are 
attempting to regulate, with mixed results. 
Fracking states have taken markedly different approaches to fracking, 
resulting in a mash-up of inconsistent regulatory regimes. Approaches vary 
widely. For example, North Dakota and West Virginia view fracking as an 
150. See generally ADAM VANN, BRANDON J. MURRILL & MARY TIEMANN, CONGo RESEARCH 
SERV., R43152, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1, 5--8, 9-13, 20-22, 24 (2014), 
available at http://fas.orglsgp/crs/misc/R43152.pdf (discussing fracking and the Safe Drinking Water 
Act; Oean Water Act; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act; and Toxic Substances Control Act). 
151. See Gosman, supra, note 102, at 140 n.388 (citing Chemical Use in Hydraulic Fracturing, 
FRAcFocus, http://fracfocus.orglwater·protectionfdrilling-usage (last visited Mar. 6, 2015), which 
states that "[aJ typical fracture treatment will use very low concentrations of between 3 and 12 additive 
chemicals"). 
152. Id. at 112-13 (noting that the "nature of the chemical activity" associated with fracking 
"poses a fundamental challenge to" the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 
(enacted to inform the public about chemical risk); the Toxic Substances Control Act (enacted to 
govern the production and use of toxic chemicals); and the Safe Drinking Water Act (concerning the 
injection of fluids underground». 
153. 33 U.S.c. §§ 1251-1387 (2012). 
154. ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 27, at 34. 
155. Id. at 36. 
156. Id. 
157. See EPA's Study of Hydraulic Fracturing for Oil and Gas and Its Potential Impact on 
Drinking Water, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa.govlhfstudy (last updated Feb. 
5,2015). 
158. EPA's Study of Hydraulic Fracturing and Its Potential Impact on Drinking Water 
Resources: Published Scientific Papers, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://wwwZ.epa.gov/ 
hfstudy/published-scientific-papers (last updated Feb. 5, 2015) (listing all of the scientific reports 
published by the EPA since 2013). 
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opportunity and have thus taken a permissive view of fracking. 159 North Dakota 
has even set aside $1 million in a fund to fight against EPA efforts to regulate 
fracking.160 Pennsylvania has also taken a particularly permissive view of 
fracking. 161 In 2010, drilling companies were issued roughly 3,300 Marcellus gas-
well permits in Pennsylvania, an astronomical increase from the 117 permits 
issued in 2007. 162 In New York and Vermont, however, the approach has been 
more cautious. In 2010, New York's then-Governor David Patterson placed a 
moratorium on fracking to study its impacts. 163 Four years later, Governor 
Andrew Cuomo announced a state-wide ban on tracking. l64 Vermont has 
banned the practice outright as well. 165 
The local is also implicated. At the local level, cities and towns with shale 
deposits beneath them have faced both community and industry pressure to 
make way for fracking. The interests at play create a complex picture. Fracking 
cannot happen unless local zoning laws permit it, and some states have taken 
steps to preempt local authority. Pennsylvania provides one example of the 
tensions playing out between local and state authorities. In a bold move, in 2011 
the Pennsylvania state legislature passed legislation that preempts local 
ordinances that regulate gas well operations. 166 A portion of the Pennsylvania 
legislation provided that local land-use ordinances "shall allow for the 
reasonable development" of the Marcellus Shale. 167 In the winter of 2013, the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania overturned this provision,168 but there appears 
to be a wider trend developing.169 In another pro-fracking state, West Virginia, 
efforts by the City of Morgantown to prohibit fracking were thwarted by the 
159. Joshua P. Fershee. The Oil and Gas Evolution: Learning from the Hydraulic Fracturing 
Experiences in North Dakota and West Virginia, 19 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 23 (2012). 
160. Id. at 32. 
161. Newly elected Governor of Pennsylvania, Tom Wolf, recently proposed a five-percent tax 
on all natural gas drilling in the Marcellus Shale to fund Pennsylvania schools. Joel Mathis, Wolf 
Proposes Gas-Drilling Tax, PHILA. MAG. (Feb. 11, 2015, 12:41 PM), http://www.phillymag.comlnews/ 
2015102/111wolf-proposes-gas-drilling-taxJ?utm_source=iContact&utm_medium=email&utm_campaig 
n=EDIT:%20News&utm_content=P.M.+News+2%2F11 %2F15. 
162. Ian Urbina, Regulation Lax as Gas Wells' Tainted Water Hits Rivers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 
2011, at AI. 
163. Mary Esch, NY "Fracking" Ban: Governor David Paterson Orders Natural Gas Hydraulic 
Fracturing Moratorium for Seven Months in New York, HUFFINGTON POST (May 25,2011,6:20 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.coml2010112/13/ny-fracking-ban-david-paterson_n_795730.html. 
164. Kaplan, supra note 26 (discussing the recently passed ban on fracking in New Yark State). 
165. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 571 (2015) ("(a) No person may engage in hydraulic fracturing in 
the State. (b) No person within the State may collect, store, or treat wastewater from hydraulic 
fracturing."). 
166. See Perkins, supra note 135, at 45-46 (citing to challenged provision of Act 13 of 2012, a 
statute amending the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act). 
167. See id. at 46. 
168. See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 982 (Pa. 2013) (overturning the 
preemption provision based on the public trust doctrine). 
169. See, e.g., Fershee, supra note 159, at 31 (explaining how state legislatures in New York and 
North Dakota have recently battled with municipalities over regulatory control of hydraulic 
fracturing). 
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Monongalia County Circuit Court, which stated that the stale "[l]egislature 
explicitly set forth a comprehensive framework for the application for oil well 
permits" and thus the City of Morgantown lacked the ability to "impose a 
complete ban on fracking or to regulate oil and gas development and 
production."170 The New York Court of Appeals recently held that localities 
could amend zoning laws to prohibit fracking. 17! These efforts highlight the 
extraordinarily disparate approaches states have taken in an effort to fill in, or 
simply leave open, the regulatory gaps. 
Capitalizing on these regulatory absences, the industry has moved quickly 
to involve local communities in the permitting process, to engage state officials in 
the law-making process, and to argue that no federal oversight is needed. The 
result is clear. Fracking resides in the gray zone of development. Despite recent 
local, state, and federal efforts, fracking remains lightly regulated and 
fragmented at best. 172 
Another regulatory challenge arises with respect to the nature of fracking 
developers. They are private entities. This private label inures the developers 
with certain characteristics and privileges. Of course, as an initial matter, these 
entities are chartered for profit. Whether publicly held or privately held, fracking 
companies exist for the benefit of shareholders, which makes profit 
maximization paramount. I73 This shareholder primacy can also lead to risk 
taking that harms the greater public. 174 
Second, this private characterization allows developers to avoid disclosure 
of the chemicals utilized in the fracking process. The disclosure issue presents 
one of the key gaps in regulatory oversight. The chemicals, called "proppants," 
keep the shale fissures propped open while gas is released.!75 There is currently 
170. Northeast Natural Energy, LLC v. City of Morgantown, No. ll-C-411, 2011 WL 3584376, 
*8-9 (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 12, 2011); see also David Giller, Comment, Implied Preemption and Its 
Effect on Local Hydrofracking Bans in New York, 21 J.L. & POL'y 631, 651 (2013) (noting that the 
West Virginia Oil and Gas Act was held by West Virginia's Monongalia County Circuit Court to 
preempt local action). 
171. Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E.3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014); see Kate Taylor & Thomas 
Kaplan, New York Towns Can Use Zoning to Prohibit Fracking, State's Top Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 1, 2014, at A16 (analyzing the court's decision and the impact it has on the ability of localities to 
regulate fracking); see also Kaplan, supra note 26 (discussing Governor Cuomo's December 2014 
decision to impose a statewide fracking ban in New York). 
172. See Elizabeth Burleson, Cooperative Federalism and Hydraulic Fracturing: A Human Right 
to a Clean Environment, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'y 289, 308 (2012) (noting that "[fJragmented 
federal provisions still address limited unconventional gas development"). 
173. Cf. Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 
163 (2008) (bringing into question the commonly held view that corporations exist to maximize 
shareholder value). 
174. See, e.g., Dan Awrey, William Blair & David Kershaw, Between Law and Markets: Is There 
a Role for Culture and Ethics in Financial Regulation?, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 195 (2013) (noting that 
"the existing governance arrangements within financial institutions in many jurisdictions directly or 
indirectly (to differing degrees) give primacy to the financial interests of shareholders and, thereby, 
create incentive structures which reward opportunistic behavior and socially excessive risk-taking"). 
175. Oilfield Glossary: Proppant, SCHLUMBERGER, http://www.glossary.oiifield.slb.com/en/ 
Terms.aspx?Lookln=term%20name&filter=proppant (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
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no federal requirement that companies disclose the contents of the chemical 
mixture injected into the ground, and fracking companies have fought to 
maintain the secrecy of the chemicals utilized in the fracking process. 176 As 
private entities, fracking companies have the right to argue for trade secret 
protection, and have found great success utilizing this strategy. In some states, 
some limited disclosure is required,177 but this is generally ex post facto, after the 
damage has been done or healthcare services are required. 17S Companies argue 
that the ex ante disclosure of the composition would amount to disclosure of 
proprietary information and thus undermine their market advantage. 179 Thus, 
the engagement in fracking by private actors creates an unintended regulatory 
gap. 
Finally, the fracking industry contains a small cast of repeat players. ISO The 
specialization of these five or six companies has increased barriers to entry for 
176. V ANN ET AL., supra note 150, at 20. 
177. For example, the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission requires disclosure of 
"the chemical additives, compounds and concentrations or rates proposed to be mixed and injected." 3 
WYo. CODE. R. § 45(d) (LexisNexis 2014). This disclosure requirement notwithstanding, the owner or 
operator may assert that the information is proprietary, limiting the right of the public to access the 
information. See Keith B. Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: Trade Secrets and the Mandatory Disclosure of 
Fracturing Water Composition, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 399, 412 (2013) (noting that companies have 
frequently sought such protection). 
178. A sampling of the nine early adopters of disclosure requirements reveals a trend of limited 
disclosure: Arkansas (list of proposed products and chemicals due before fracking, updated list due 
after; limited disclosure of proprietary information to healthcare professionals and regulators); 
Colorado (list due within sixty days of fracking activity; limited disclosure of proprietary information 
to healthcare professionals and regulators); Louisiana (list due within twenty days of well completion; 
disclosure of chemical family required, but not specific chemical names); Michigan (list of Material 
Safety Data Sheets containing limited information on hazardous chemicals due within sixty days of 
drilling completion; no disclosure of proprietary information to regulators or public); Montana (list 
due before and after fracking; disclosure of chemical family required, and proprietary chemicals to 
healthcare providers in emergency); Ohio (Material Safety Data Sheet listing products' chemical 
components due sixty days after drilling is complete; not disclosed to regulators or public); 
Pennsylvania (list due within thirty days of well completion; disclosed to regulators and available to 
public on request to Department of Environmental Protection); Texas (disclosure within thirty days 
after well completion, with some variation on deadlines; no disclosure of trade secret information 
unless required by the attorney general or court); and Wyoming (list due before and after fracking; 
disclosed to the supervisor of the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, but not to the 
public). Fracking Chemical Disclosure Rules, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 16, 2012, 2:44 PM), 
http://www.propublica.org/special/fracking-chemical-disclosure-rules;seealsoHall.supranotel77.at 
408 (discussing seventeen states that have adopted rules regarding disclosure). 
179. See Hall, supra note 177, at 406. 
180. See Fitzgerald, supra, note 139, at 1354 (noting that Halliburton, Schlumberger, BJ, and 
Sanjel enjoy "prominent positions," and that Halliburton, Schlumberger, and BJ have a seventy-five 
percent market share for the high-pressure pumps used in fracking); see also Laurel Brubaker Calkins, 
Halliburton, Schlumberger Accused in Fracking Price Suit, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2. 2013, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2013-08-0lIhalliburton-schlumberger-accused-in-fracking-price-suit. 
html (discussing an investigation of Halliburton, Co., Shlumberger Ltd., and Baker Hughes Inc. by the 
U.S. Department of Justice for anticompetitive practices, and stating that the "three companies are the 
largest publicly trading fracking service providers and jointly control about 60 percent of the U.S. 
market"). Given the diversity of services involved in the fracking process, determining exact market 
share of the various players is difficult; however, the top developers are well known. 
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other players, meaning that the cost of beginning a fracking company-obtaining 
the proper know-how, experts, and technology-is now so high that new 
developers may resist entry into the field. The result is well documented 
throughout highly specialized industries that utilize a small group of expert 
players (deep-sea drilling and the financial industry come to mind). Although 
there are certainly benefits and efficiencies built into organizational structures 
that use a close network of key, repeat players, as the technology of the field 
advances,181 regulation becomes increasingly difficult because only a few expert 
players possess industry-specific knowledge. Those charged with regulating the 
industry thus call upon the industry to regulate itself, resulting in regulatory 
capture. 182 
3. Fracking as Hybridity: Reliance on a Public Good 
Fracking involves one of the most precious of public resources-water. 
Fracking both requires significant amounts of water and poses significant danger 
to the water table. A single fracking treatment may consume more than 500,000 
gallons of water,183 and a well undergoing several fracking treatments can 
consume millions of gallons of water. 184 The water is either trucked or piped to 
the site. To give an idea of scale, an Olympic-size swimming pool can hold 
approximately 660,000 gallons of water, and the average annual per capita 
consumption of water in the United States is 522,000 gallons. 185 By any measure, 
this consumption level outpaces the rate of replenishment, which is troubling 
given the climatic instability facing many regions. 
The water resource issue is of particular concern in Texas, the location of 
the Barnett and Eagle Ford shale plays. Over the past two years, the Ogallala 
Aquifer has faced extraordinary strain under the weight of the third worst 
181. See, e.g., Tyler Weiti, CBD v. BLM, BLM's Revised Proposed Regulations, and the Thorny 
Way Forward for Fracking, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10550, 10551 (2013) (discussing 
Center for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Management, 937 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 
2013), where the court held that the Bureau of Land Management's environmental impact statement 
failed to consider properly the impact of fracking "when used in combination with technologies such 
as horizontal drilling" and noting that the pace and density of fracking were at issue in the case and 
similar fracking challenges). 
182. See Evan Bush, U.S. Advisory Group on Fracking Has Abundant Ties to Energy Industry, 
CrR. FOR PuB. INTEGRITY (May 19, 2014, 12:19 PM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/08/10/5683/ 
us-advisory-group-fracking-has-abundant-ties-energy-industry (explaining that scientists sought to 
oust former CIA chief and director of energy companies from energy panel); see also Brian Grow, 
Joshua Schneyer & Anna Driver, Energy Firm Uses 'Land Grabs' co Secure Fracking Rights from 
Reluctant Landowners, NBC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2012, 8:36 AM), http://investigations.nbcnews.coml_news/ 
2012/10102/14183177 -energy -firm-uses-land -gra bs-to-secure-fracking -righ ts-from ore lucta nt -landowne rs 
("Energy companies and their executives are the dominant contributors to the election campaigns of 
railroad commission members and candidates, according to a Reuters review of Texas Ethics 
Commission data."). 
183. ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 27, at 24. 
184. [d. 
185. [d. 
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drought in Texas since 1895. 186 The region is undergoing a transformation from a 
semiarid climate to a desert. 187 This rapid desertification raises serious questions 
about the sustainability of fracking, particularly in light of the needs of the local 
population. 
Communities in the Delaware River Basin, home to New York City and 
other cities in the eastern United States, have also raised alarm bells regarding 
the use and potential contamination of their water supply.188 The fracking 
process destabilizes the geologic environment where shale deposits exist, which 
increases risks to groundwater. For example, in the Marcellus Shale region, the 
same process that led to the layers of deposit of rock and shale has kept gas 
confined beneath the surface and prevented the natural seepage of gas to the 
surface. 189 The fracking process intentionally brings gas to the surface by drilling 
wells through overlying aquifers, which poses danger to groundwater. An 
adequately designed and cased well properly prevents fracking fluids from 
leaking into the groundwater supply, but as recognized by researchers at the 
Congressional Research Service, an improperly constructed and cased well could 
"allow contaminated water to flow from the ground surface and enter the water 
well, possibly compromising the quality of drinking water in the well and even 
the drinking water aquifer itself."190 In addition, fluids spilled on the ground 
186. The Ogallala Aquifer, also known as the High Plains Aquifer, is "one of the world's largest 
underground sources of freshwater," underlying the states in the middle of the country from South 
Dakota to the northwestern edge of Texas. Jim Malewitz, In Drought Ravaged Plains, Efforts to Save a 
Vital Aquifer, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.orglenlresearch-and-
analysislhlogs/statelineI2013/03/18/in-drought-ravaged-plains-efforts-to-save-a-vital-aquifer. For many 
decades, the aquifer has faced decline due to farming activities overlying the aquifer. In some parts of 
Kansas and Texas, the aquifer has "declined as much as 200 feet." Id. Although the ongoing drought in 
the region has certainly contributed to the decline, the emergence of fracking has raised fears within 
the farming community about the longevity of the resource. Id.; see also Manny Fernandez, Drought 
Takes Its Toll on a Texas Business, a Town and Its Families, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 28, 2013, at A12 
(describing how drought "has dried up pastures and increased the costs of hay and feed, forcing some 
ranchers to sell off their herds to reduce expenses"); Bob Port, Fracking's Thirst for Water: Investors 
Warned of the Hidden Financial Risks, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/n 
ews/2014-02-06/fracking-s-thirst-for-water-investors-warned-of-the-hidden-financial-risks.html (noting 
that "fracking becomes a big factor locally when it competes in a dry landscape, because the process 
tends to foul and remove water from the earth's natural cycle of replenishment"). 
187. See, e.g., Joe Romm, James Hansen Is Correct About Catastrophic Projections for u.s. 
Drought if We Don't Act Now, THINKPROGRESS (May 13, 2012, 3:50 PM), http://thinkprogress.orgl 
cIimate/2012/05113/483247/james-hansen-is-correct-about-catastrophic-projections-for-us-drought-if-
we-dont-act-nowl (defending assertions that the semiarid region from North Dakota to Texas could be 
permanently altered by drought). 
188. See Delaware River Basin Commission: Battleground for Gas Drilling, STATEIMPACf, 
http://stateimpact.npr.orglpennsylvania/tagldrbcl (last visited Mar. 6, 2015); Eliza Griswold, Situation 
Normal All Fracked Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at MM44 (noting animal deaths, black faucet 
water, corrosion of home appliances that use water, and the smell of rotten eggs and diarrhea in tap 
water in the Amwell Township of Pennsylvania). 
189. ANDREWS ET AL., supra, note 27, at 26. 
190. /d. 
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during the fracking process could seep into the groundwater,191 which is 
problematic in Pennsylvania and New York, where superficial and highly 
permeable aquifers are present. l92 
Frack operators may also discharge flow back to surface waters if such 
discharge poses no violation to water standards, or alternatively, the produced 
water may be injected back into the earth.193 As discussed, these activities are 
not regulated, and given that little is known about the exact composition of 
fracking chemicals, these activities may also pose significant risks to 
groundwater. 
Hybrid development methods rely heavily, if not exclusively, on public 
goods for success. This relationship with public goods, coupled with a lack of 
comprehensive regulation, leads to risks that are unchecked and often systemic. 
4. Fracking as Hybridity: Systemic Risk 
The risks of fracking fall into three primary categories: environmental, 
social, and economic. In reality, these are not distinct categories; they overlap, 
bleed into and affect each other. For example, environmental risks create 
economic risks for communities, drillers, and possibly the banks holding the 
mortgage for leased property. Both environmental and economic risks lead to 
social risks for entire communities that rely on a stable environment and 
economy. These linkages are addressed below. 
a. Environmental Risk 
As to environmental harm, the risks of diminishing the water table and 
affecting soil are of central concern. The rate of water consumption required to 
sustain fracking operations outpaces the natural rate of replenishment. 194 As 
discussed, this raises particular concern in Texas and other water-poor regions. 
Once the water leaves the water table, it is lost forever. 195 The risk is not limited 
to the environment; it is also economic. 
The potential loss of a reliable water source poses significant risks to the 
communities where fracking takes place. Such communities are largely rural and 
depend on water not just for daily life, but also to sustain and maintain economic 
activity that predated shale development. In this way, these communities face 
191. See David A. Dana & Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the Energy 
Revolution: Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic Fracturing, 
99 IOWA L. REV. 1523, 1543 (2014) (citing to the New Mexico Oil Conservation Division's list of 
"Cases Where Pit Substances Contaminated New Mexico's Ground Water," a list of over 450 cases). 
192. ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 27, at 26. 
193. [d. at 34. 
194. See supra notes and accompanying text 183-85 for a discussion of the amount of water 
used in a single fracking treatment. 
195. Jacques Leslie, High Noon at the Ogallala Aquifer, SALON (Feb. 1, 2001, 3:00 PM), 
http://www.salon.coml2001/02/01lwater_texas/ (explaining that the OgaUala Aquifer holds water 
"sealed underground for hundreds of thousands of years. Once it's used, it's gone forever. "). 
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both the environmental risk of water depletion, and the additional social and 
economic risks associated therewith, including the loss of the means to farm. 196 
Moreover, a recent study produced by a group of Duke professors at 
Nicolas School of the Environment indicated "systematic evidence for methane 
contamination of drinking water associated with shale-gas extraction.,,197 The 
group analyzed the groundwater in sixty-eight private wells and pointed to four 
risks: (1) gas and water discharge to aquifers due to fracking activities, including 
high-pressure injection of fracking fluids into wells; (2) toxicity and radioactivity 
of produced fracking water, which contains a mix of fracking fluid and saline 
formation waters; (3) explosive and asphyxiation hazard associated with natural 
gas; and (4) the reliance by rural communities on shallow groundwater.198 The 
study ends with a word of caution and raises concerns regarding the "important 
environmental risks accompanying shale-gas exploration worldwide."199 
The basic definition of systemic risk in the financial context could be 
analogized to the systemic risk concerns that relate to fracking. For example, 
ground water contamination in the Ogallala Aquifer in Texas could cause serious 
ripple effects throughout the state, and potentially the country. The aquifer is the 
lifeblood of rural and urban communities in the state and surrounding states. 200 
Rural communities rely on the aquifer for drinking needs, farming, and raising 
livestock. Although Austin and Houston rely on other regional aquifers for 
water,201 population growth in the state has placed groundwater resources under 
strain. 202 These cities, and the people and businesses in them, contribute vital tax 
dollars to public coffers. Any scenario involving a fresh water scare might lead to 
an out-migration of communities, or worse: pressure on surrounding 
communities or states to ensure the needs of a water-deprived community were 
met. 
196. See Julia Haggerty, Patricia H. Gude, Mark Delorey & Ray Rasker, Long·Term Effects of 
Income Specialization in Oil and Gas Extraction: The U.S. West, 1980-2011, 45 ENERGY ECON. 186, 
193-94 (discussing study on oil and gas and their long-term economic effects); see also Ask Farm Aid: 
A Lot of Farmers in My Area Are Leasing Their Land for Hydraulic Fracturing-Is it Good or Bad? 
What Do Farmers Say?, FARM AID (June 2011), http://www.farmaid.org/site/apps/ninet/content2.aspx? 
c=qII5IhNVJsE&b=2723877&ct=10863325 (describing the negative effects from fracking noted by 
farmers, such as cows drinking contaminated water and dying, as well as cattle quarantined after 
drinking wastewater). 
197. Osborn et aI., supra note 38, at 8172. 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Kate Galbraith, Ogallala Aquifer in Texas Panhandle Suffers Big Drop, STATEIMPACf 
(May 22, 2013, 2:52 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/texasI2013/05/22/0gallala-aquifer-in-texas-
panhandle-suffers-big-drop/. See supra note 186 and accompany text for a discussion of the Ogallala 
Aquifer. 
201. PETER G. GEORGE, ROBERT E. MACE & RIMA PERTOSSIAN, REPORT 380, AQUIFERS OF 
TEXAS, 3-4 (July 2011), available at http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/publications/reports/numbered_ 
reports/doc/R380_AquifersofTexas.pdf. 
202. Phil Magers, Analysis: Texas Cities Seek Water Options, UNITED PRESS INT'L (Aug. 19, 
2004, 6:59 PM), http://www.upi.com!Business_News/Security-Industry/2004/08/19IAnalysis-Texas-
cities-seek-water-options/538410929563581 (citing population growth as adding to strain on water 
resources). 
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For a more concrete example, we can also look to the state of Colorado, a 
fracking state, where access to fresh water is of increasing concern. The state has 
already begun to tighten its regulatory approach to water use in light of 
fracking,203 and the cost of water in Colorado has also limited farmers' ability to 
access desperately needed resources. 204 Damage to its groundwater could 
exacerbate the current strain facing its communities. The groundwater damage 
scenario has the potential to cause the domino effect common with systemic risk. 
Unfortunately, given the low probability of such an occurrence, the risk is 
minimized and not properly "priced" by fracking developers. 205 This, coupled 
with the failure to recognize the potential interconnectedness of a potential 
groundwater shock, makes it politically difficult to regulate in this area, and 
presents a classic case of systemic risk. 
The density of fracking well placement also intensifies the risk associated 
with the mechanism. Once a drill pad is drilled, several wells are placed at the 
drill site. This concentration of wells creates a multiplier effect whereby one drill 
pad requires resources, such as water, that exceed the capacity of the local 
area. 206 As a result, water from outside the area is trucked in, which not only 
affects the area from which water is drawn, but also leads to problems in the area 
surrounding the well. This importation of water may sound minor, but critics of 
fracking have cited increased trucking traffic as a significant concern for 
communities dealing with fracking. 207 In addition, once the trucked-in water 
becomes flowback, or wastewater, it must be stored, injected underground, 
trucked out, or, in some cases, released into surface waters. 20S The sheer volume 
of wastewater stored at high-density fracking sites also raises concerns. Density, 
a strategy for increasing developer return, thus leads to increased risks. 
With respect to soil issues, the chemical-laced water leaving fracking wells is 
stored in large pools. Whether such pools are lined or unlined, they pose a risk to 
203. Robin Kundis Craig, Hydraulic Fracturing (Fracking), Federalism, and the Water-Energy 
Nexus, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 241, 251, 254 (2013) (discussing regulations and increasing demand on 
Colorado water supply due to fracking). 
204. See Jack Healy, Option for Drilling Pits Farmers Against Water-Thirsty Oil Wells, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, at Al (noting that prices have gone from $30 per acre foot of water up to $200 for 
the same amount of treated water in parts of Colorado, which adds to the coffers of local utilities but 
burdens farmers). 
205. Robertson, supra note 94, at 1280 (noting that the critiques of fracking center around the 
"potentially disastrous, albeit unlikely, consequences of groundwater contamination, explosion at 
wells or drilling sites, depletion of freshwater supply, ... and disposal of contaminated flowback 
water"). 
206. See ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 27, at 17, 24 (arguing that drilling multiple wells from a 
single pad cuts costs, and describing how wells subject to multiple treatments may consume millions of 
gallons of water). 
207. Elizabeth Souder, Exxon May Export Natural Gas, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 31, 
2012, at D01. 
208. ANDREWS ET AL., supra note 27, at 34, 35 n.69 (discussing the problems associated with, 
and various approaches to, wastewater disposal, such as a West Virginia drilling company that "has its 
hydraulic fracturing wastewater trucked to an out-of-state commercial facility that treats the water and 
then injects i[t] into depleted oil and gas reservoirs"). 
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commumtIes where fracking is permitted. 209 These pools carry known 
carcinogens, and when they leak, they have the potential to wreak havoc on the 
water table. Once the water table is damaged, the water drawn into the 
community water supply is unfit for human or animal consumption.210 
b. Social Risk 
The foregoing environmental harms tie into a significant but infrequently 
discussed social risk: transformation of rural communities. 211 The overall impact 
of fracking on the rural American landscape cannot be overstated. As an initial 
matter, the communities subjected to natural gas development are among the 
poorest in the nation, structurally excluded from economic prosperity.212 The 
U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA) map of current fracking development 
shows broad swaths of the northeastern, midwestern, and southwestern regions 
of the country sitting on shale rock. 213 An overlay of the census map upon the 
EIA natural gas development map reveals a striking situation. The poorest 
regions of the country are rich in shale, which in some ways has forced 
communities and individuals into a false choice between economic prosperity 
and ecological ruin.214 
The seven largest shale plays-Antrim, Barnett, Devonian, Fayetteville, 
Woodford, Haynesville, and Marcellus-exist in diverse regions of the country; 
however the Marcellus Shale play holds the greatest promise. 215 Embedded deep 
in the hollows that already bear the scars of generations of coal mining, the 
Marcellus Shale play runs through Appalachia, one of the poorest regions in the 
United States.216 
The social tensions arising from fracking operations are familiar. There are 
winners and losers in the new era of development. Private landowners certainly 
reap benefits, as do those able to benefit from positive spillover effects of jobs 
created in the service industry, increases in real estate prices, and those who 
obtain training on the wells themselves. 217 But these spillover effects are also 
209. See Griswold, supra note 188 (discussing leaks in lining). 
210. /d. 
211. See Michael Burger, Fracking and Federalism Choice, 161 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 150, 159 
(2013) (identifying fracking's potentially transformative effects on the rural American landscape and 
cultural impacts on rural America as matters of national interest). 
212. See Howard, supra note 31, at 116, 153-54. 
213. Lower 48 States Shale Plays, supra note 30. 
214. [d.; Poverty Rates by County: 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/did/www/ 
saipe/datalhighlights/files/20121F6_MP _20l2.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
215. See ANDREWS ET AL, supra note 27, at 4 (noting that, according to a report by Navigant 
consulting, the Marcellus Shale play appears larger than the plays already developed). 
216. The Marcellus play runs beneath a substantial portion of West Virginia, western and 
northeastern Pennsylvania, southern New York, eastern Ohio, and portions of Virginia and Maryland. 
[d. at 10--11; see also Poverty Rates by County: 2012, supra note 214. 
217. See Brasier et al., supra note 133, at 35 ("Training local workers can take a substantial 
amount of time, and assumes that training is available and workers want to receive training and work 
in this industry. Many jobs generated from energy development focus on providing goods and services 
to workers. These jobs often have less stability and offer fewer benefits. In addition, although 
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often referred to as the "boomtown" phenomenon. Just like the coal towns 
before them, regions where fracking is prevalent experience artificially high 
prices on nearly everything-food, land, homes, and retail goodS. 218 Researchers 
have found that these rapid changes can strain the social fabric of a community, 
leading to increased crime and substance abuse. 219 And for those at the margins 
of society, the boomtown effect-particularly, the increase in commodity 
prices-can lead to or exacerbate financial stress. 220 
c. Economic Risk 
Finally, as has been noted by a handful of observers, hidden financial risks 
may also exist within fracking.221 The land leases that serve as the basis for the 
fracking operation may involve land that is not owned outright by the lessor. The 
property is subject to a mortgage, which means that banks ultimately hold the 
risk associated with the mortgage. Although there are typically restrictions on a 
mortgagee's ability to lease his land for hazardous activity, these restrictions 
have not prevented mortgagees from doing SO.222 As such, many banks own 
mortgages on land where fracking is taking place. Given the myriad 
environmental hazards and liabilities that may arise from the activity, and the 
subsequent risk of a landowner's default resulting therefrom, the presence of 
fracking may reflect a latent risk to the financial markets. Although developers 
may mitigate their own economic risk through investments in derivatives that 
provide a hedge against the risk of lower production in wells (which inherently 
produce less gas after the initial spike in production),223 banks holding mortgages 
would spread their risk into the financial markets, a potential precursor to 
another public financial shock. 
Further, several industry insiders have referred to the exuberance 
associated with the fracking boom as a Ponzi scheme. 224 In hundreds of 
documents uncovered by the New York Times, the profitability of fracking is 
questioned. One official, a former Enron employee, stated: 
businesses catering to industry can see a surge in profits, local businesses may compete with each other 
and the new extractive industry for skilled workers (e.g., mechanics, heavy equipment operators, truck 
drivers). This competition leads to a shortage of skilled workers and strains the ability of local 
businesses to provide commensurate wages and benefits."). 
218. [d. at 45. 
219. [d. at 36. 
220. [d. at 48 ("Those who are already economically disadvantaged or those who do not own 
sizable acres for leasing may only suffer the negative consequences of development."). 
221. Urbina, supra note 39, at A12 (noting that, in light of many of the risks associated with 
fracking, the Department of Agriculture may expand its environmental review before issuing 
mortgages on land subject to oil and gas drilling). 
222. Ian Urbina, A Rush to Sign Leases for Gas Runs into Mortgage Restriction, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 20, 2011, at AI. 
223. Fitzgerald, supra note 139, at 1343. 
224. Drilling Down, Documents: Leaked Industry E-mails and Reports, Shale Gas a "Ponzi 
Scheme," Says IHS Drilling Data Official, N.Y. TIMES 1, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/us/ 
natural-gas-drilling-down-documents-4.html?_r=0#document/plla22779 (last visited Mar. 6, 2015) 
(showing the response to a fracking industry publication critiquing shale gas economics, an official at a 
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So why is it that all of us that are investing our own money are 
choosing not to invest ... are we all wrong? The education that I got at 
Enron with these type of people ... has given me more confidence to 
go with what I believe once I have the data needed to make the proper 
decision. I now have the proper data needed to evaluate the 
Haynesville Shale and I will be sitting it out for the foreseeable 
future. 225 
On the whole, the current approach to fracking presents all of the features 
of hybridity: private activity in a regulatory vacuum that regularly touches upon 
public goods, and a scenario riddled with interconnected, localized, and systemic 
risks. Yet fracking is treated in the current debate as an isolated occurrence, 
narrowly confined to a method of natural gas extraction that should be 
regulated. The next Section explains the current debate and shows its limitations 
by reviewing and critiquing the three key governance frameworks that have been 
offered to regulate fracking. In the end, the Section concludes, it is not 
regulation of fracking alone that needs to be addressed; the aspects of fracking's 
hybridity must be addressed. 
IV. BROADENING THE DEBATE 
An active debate regarding regulating the fracking industry is currently 
underway.226 Fracking engages multiple levels of governance-local, state, and 
federal-yet no clear regulatory framework has emerged. 227 Landowners see 
fracking as an opportunity to utilize their freedom of contract and to obtain 
substantial personal economic benefits. Local governments may see their 
community as the next boomtown and view fracking as a way out of economic 
hardship. These interests are sometimes misaligned with the greater public 
interest, and localities have struggled to balance the two, often yielding to the 
interests of private parties. A deeper misalignment occurs at the federal level. 
The federal government currently lacks a comprehensive mechanism for 
regulating fracking. In fact, no comprehensive regulatory mechanism exists for 
research firm that specializes in energy states that "the word among independent oil and gas producers 
is that shale gas drilling is a Ponzi scheme and that it will be difficult for companies to make money in 
the Marcellus and Haynesville shale formations"); see a/so Christopherson & Rightor, supra note 37, 
at 4 (noting that "[i]ndustry investment advisors are cautious about the long-term productivity of all 
U.S. natural gas plays" given that production rates drop off sharply after initial drilling takes place). 
225. Drilling Down, supra note 224, at 8. 
226. See, e.g., Burger, supra note 211, at 151; Burleson, supra note 172, at 308; Spence, supra 
note 140, at 434; see also David Spence & Jody Freeman, Should the Federal Government Regulate 
Fracking?, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2013, 4:16 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/artic1es/SBlO0014241 
27887323495104578314302738867078. 
227. On May 16, 2013, the U.S. Department of the Interior updated its proposed safety 
standards for hydraulic fracturing on public and Native American lands. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of 
the Interior, Interior Releases Updated Draft Rule for Hydraulic Fracturing on Public and Indian 
Lands for Public Comment (May 13, 2013), http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/interior-releases-
updated-draft-rule-for-hydraulic-fracturing-on-public-and-indian-lands-for-public-comment.cfm. The 
press release notes, "Domestic production from more than 92,000 oil and gas wells on public lands 
accounts for about 13 percent of the nation's natural gas production and 5 percent of its oil 
production." /d. 
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onshore oil and gas development. 228 This has given rise to a veritable patchwork 
of regulatory responses to the fracking phenomenon, due in part to the 
extraordinary privileges afforded the fracking industry. 
This Section highlights and summarizes the key federalism and new 
governance arguments, while exploring the ways these approaches, standing 
alone, are too limited and may even exacerbate the problems of hybridity. 
A. A Critique of the Current Debates 
In consideration of the problems associated with fracking, scholars, 
legislators, and communities have turned to the question of governance. How 
should fracking be governed? The current debate focuses on the federalism 
binary: Should the state or federal government manage the complex array of 
questions and unknowns that surround fracking? More recently, this discussion 
has also broadened to incorporate more flexible alternatives, such as cooperative 
federalism, as advocated by Professor Elizabeth Burleson;229 or dynamic 
federalism, as suggested by Professors Osofsky and Wiseman. 23o The next Part 
begins with federalism. 
1. A State Approach to Regulation 
The federalism debate is active. In Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the 
Political Economy of Energy Production, Professor David Spence recognizes the 
dearth of comprehensive regulation for fracking operations, but argues that a 
policy-neutral federalism analysis reveals that there is no need for a 
comprehensive federal regulatory scheme for fracking. 231 Spence relies on four 
standard justifications for federal regulation: 
(1) to address spillover effects that cross state boundaries, (2) to 
prevent economic forces at the state level from initiating a "race to the 
bottom" in environmental regulation, (3) to promote business 
efficiencies through uniform national standards, and (4) to respond to 
national interests in the development of natural resources through a 
federal licensing system.232 
He argues that none of these are present with fracking. This view is too myopic, 
as Spence's lens fails to incorporate a broader developmental perspective that 
would account for the problematic features of hybridity. 
As to the spillover effects question, Spence concludes that the externalities 
associated with fracking-environmental, health, and safety related-do not 
regularly cross state lines. With respect to water regulation, Spence explains that 
228. Spence, supra note 140, at 447. 
229. See Burleson, supra note 172, at 291 (asserting that "filling the regulatory gaps governing 
unconventional natural gas can best be accomplished through genuinely adaptive and collaborative 
governance"). 
230. See Osofsky & Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, supra note 80, 807-08 (proposing a 
dynamic federalism model of energy regulation). 
231. Spence, supra note 140, at 431. 
232. [d. 
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federal jurisdiction is limited to surface waters and wetlands; states in the heart 
of fracking country have various water resources. For example, Texas has limited 
water supplies, whereas water is abundant in places like New York. Thus, he 
concludes, because the national interest is not implicated, the states should 
regulate this aspect of fracking. 233 
Spence similarly dispenses of social externalities concerns, arguing that "the 
question of how (and how much) to regulate fracking" goes directly to the issue 
of local impacts. 234 Thus, it should be managed locally. Regarding the increased 
greenhouse gas emissions that may result from fracking operations, Spence 
argues that the research regarding emissions from natural gas operations is in its 
infancy, but that the EPA's ongoing efforts to understand the impacts of fracking 
could lead to tighter federal rules. 235 He also recognizes many of the concerns 
with the underground injection of fracking flowback water, but states that this 
too merits further research. Based on current information, he argues, this 
process does not warrant federal intervention.236 Finally, on the groundwater 
question, Spence cites to conflicting studies and concludes that the conditions in 
certain states may leave them more susceptible to groundwater contamination 
than others, and thus, the issue of regulation is a state one. 237 
Spence finds the other rationales for federal intervention similarly 
unavailing. He argues that the race-to-the-bottom rationale doesn't fit the 
fracking scenario; fracking operators will be forced to operate locally, given that 
shale deposits are located in specific areas, there is no "race to the bottom."238 
Thus, in the face of externalities, the public will force regulators to regulate. 239 
Because Spence believes that there is no move toward a national regulatory 
regime to secure the proliferation of natural gas production, he concludes that 
fracking does not threaten national security. 240 
As should be evident, these arguments fail to capture the systemic risk 
aspects of hybridity. Even if fracking activities are contained within state 
borders, the environmental, economic, and social risks of the activities have the 
233. Id. at 479. 
234. Id. at 483. 
235. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of current EPA efforts to 
study fracking. 
236. Id. at 490. In particular, Spence discusses the increase in seismic activity in areas where 
fracking wastewater has been injected. Spence notes that areas in Ohio, Oklahoma, and Arkansas 
have all experienced increases in seismic activity as a result of fracking operations. Id.; see also Lindsay 
Abrams, Frack·happy Oklahoma Is the Reigning Earthquake Capital a/the U.S., SALON (Feb. 11, 2015, 
1:55 PM), http://www.salon.coml2015/02/111frack_happy_oklahoma_is_the_reignin~earthquake_ 
capital_oLthe_u_sl (observing that, in 2014, "Oklahoma, which pre·2009 averaged one per year, had 
562 [earthquakes] - tripling the former record holder's total count"). As discussed at Section III, 
supra, the Safe Drinking Water Act does not cover this type of injection activity. 
237. /d. at 492 (concluding that states are better positioned to implement fracking regulations 
because the externalities produced by fracking operations are generally experienced locally). 
238. Id. at 494-95. 
239. Id. at 494. 
240. /d. at 501. 
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potential to bleed across borders.241 These arguments ignore the relationship 
between environmental externalities and economic externalities, both of which 
are of concern within fracking. As discussed, fracking gives rise to environmental 
harms, such as damage to the local water table, which could indeed lead to both 
environmental and economic pressures felt by neighboring states. 242 Although 
Spence argues that the watershed issues related to fracking are a local matter, 
this argument avoids consideration of the big picture: the watershed is a vital 
public resource; it connects communities, and impacts in one part of the 
watershed affect individuals in concentric circles outside the locus of damage. 
The mash-up of state approaches to fracking regulation also all but 
guarantees that some states will lower barriers to entry for some developers. 
Given that there are a limited number of players in this arena, this will indeed 
lead to a veritable "race to the bottom." There is, in fact, already a race to the 
bottom. We've seen disparate approaches in places like West Virginia and 
Pennsylvania, when held up against the more restrictive approach of New York 
and Vermont. 243 This lowering of standards could have consequences beyond 
borders, particularly in the event of a spill or other unfortunate event that cannot 
be covered by the fracking operator. For example, a particularly permissive state 
may allow for greater well density, which increases the potential environmental 
impact of a negative event and the chances that the impact will be more widely 
felt. 
On an economic level, if a private actor cannot cover its harm, the public 
pays. In some cases, the buck stops at the state level, but where harm is more far 
reaching, the federal government (i.e., taxpayers) pays. An example of this 
dynamic would be the September 2013 floods of Colorado, a fracking state. The 
floods were epic, as is increasingly common during this development moment, 
and Coloradans found that fracking oil, gas, and wastewater had entered into 
their groundwater, waterways, and food supply.244 A staff report to the Colorado 
Oil and Gas Conservation Commission confirms that oil and gas materials were 
spilled in the floods. 245 According to the report, approximately "1150 barrels 
(48,250 gallons) of oil and condensate spilled," and over "1035 barrels (43,478 
gallons) of produced water also spilled."246 Given that, for practical reasons, 
most oil and gas equipment in the state is sited near streams and waterways, the 
241. See supra Part III.D.4 for a discussion of the various risks associated with fracking. 
242. See supra Part III.D.4.a for a discussion of the environmental risks associated with 
fracking. 
243. See supra notes 159-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of disparate state and local 
approaches to fracking regulation. 
244. Jack Healy, After the Floods in Colorado, a Deluge of Worry About Leaking Oil, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 27, 2013, at A12. 
245. COLORADO OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMM'N, A STAFF REPORT TO THE 
COMMISSIONERS: "LESSONS LEARNED" IN THE FRONT RANGE FLOOD OF SEPTEMBER 2013, at 5 
(2014), available at http://cogcc.state.co.us/AnnouncementslHoCTopicsIFI00d2013lFinaIStaffReport 
LessonsLearned20140314.pdf (providing analysis and recommendations by the Commission). 
246. [d. 
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leaked material most certainly made its way into water sources. 247 This has 
interstate implications, which is a federal issue. 
Moreover, given the scope of the damage, the federal government likely 
footed the bill for some oil and gas-related harm anyway. The federal 
government acted quickly to assist Coloradans with flood-related damage. 248 
When the floodwaters receded, the administrator of federal relief funds 
dis aggregated the cost of flood damage. 249 Among the long list of relief 
categories for the nearly $449 million of aid provided are "grants, 
reimbursements, low-interest loans and insurance payments to individuals, 
businesses and communities. "250 The list does not include a category for the oil 
and gas industry,251 but the homeowners, ranchers, and farmers affected by the 
storms who also have fracking operations on their property would be eligible for 
federal relief funds. In essence, the federal government still likely paid for some 
harm related to fracking, which lends credence to the argument that it should be 
able to regulate such activity. 
In this development moment the epic floods of September 2013 will become 
increasingly commonplace. The scope and scale of hybrid development lead to 
damage that is more far-reaching, more impactful, more systemic. A state-led 
approach to regulation misses, and then exacerbates, the systemic risks of 
hybridity. 
2. A Federal Approach to Regulation 
Despite its limitations, the ability of a federal approach to regulate the 
hybridity features of fracking makes the federal approach more attractive than a 
state approach. Indeed, a comprehensive, baseline, and uniform approach to 
regulating the field would do much in the way of stemming systemic risk and 
acknowledging fracking's pervasive impact on public goods. But even this 
approach leaves unexpected gaps. 
Those in favor of a federal approach, such as Professor lody Freeman, 
argue that fracking is too important and vast in its potential impact to leave to 
the states. State deference, Professor Freeman argues, could lead to a race to the 
bottom.252 Similarly, in Fracking and Federalism Choice, Professor Michael 
Burger argues that the scope and scale of fracking give rise to cumulative 
environmental impacts that are more properly regulated by the federal 
247. Id.at4. 
248. Within a few days of the flooding, over eighty-two hundred Colorado disaster survivors 
had applied for federal relief funds, and over $1.8 million in funding had been approved. Early on, 
almost four hundred FEMA personal were on the ground in Colorado in response to the flooding. 
Lars Anderson, Colorado Flooding Update: Sept. 18, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (Sept. 18, 
2014), http://www.fema.govlblogl2013-09-18/colorado-flooding-update-sept -18. 
249. News Release, Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Disaster Recovery Going Strong 10 
Months After Flooding (July 11, 2014), http://www.fema.gov/news-release/2014/07/111disaster-
recovery -going -strong -1 0-months-after -flooding. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. Spence & Freeman, supra note 226. 
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government. 253 Further, he argues, the potential of fracking to reshape the entire 
landscape of rural America also gives rise to a national interest that merits 
federal regulation. 254 
These strong arguments for a comprehensive approach to regulating 
fracking are quite right to focus on the public goods and systemic risk features of 
fracking, but they miss a crucial feature of hybridity. These arguments lack a 
cognizance of the nature of hybridity. Quite simply, such activity is prone to a 
lack of regulation. 
As discussed, a small group of expert players makes up the core of fracking 
operators in the United States. 255 Even under a federal regime, such players 
would likely be charged with writing their own regulations. Moreover, these 
actors are private actors-limited liability entities-that are organized to 
mitigate investment risk. Thus, regulations, even properly drafted, would not 
reach many of the moral hazard features embedded within the corporate form. 
Further, the highly specialized nature of the industry would require reliance on 
the experts, and past experience has shown that this leads to regulatory 
capture. 256 
If fracking is viewed as hybridity, neither the federal nor the state approach 
to regulation fully mitigates hybridity's three problematic features: (1) private 
activity that is prone to a lack of regulation, (2) pervasive use of public goods, 
and (3) systemic risk. On the whole, while a comprehensive federal approach is 
certainly more attractive than the state-centric approach, it fails to penetrate all 
aspects of hybridity. A federal regulatory framework, if it is to work, must not 
just regulate potential risks to the entire ecosystem; it must disrupt the nature of 
the actors engaged in hybridity. Indeed, the problem, as should be evident from 
the foregoing discussion, is not fracking, per se, but the hybridity of fracking. 
3. Flexible Models Within Federalism Binary 
Perhaps the most promising and creative of the regulatory approaches thus 
far advanced is a suite of new governance approaches. This group of approaches 
has emerged primarily in the environmental and energy law scholarly 
community, and borrows heavily from the new governance, or experimentalist, 
theoretical approach. Many of the governance approaches incorporate 
decentralization principles and argue for greater participation, monitoring, and 
collaboration at multiple levels of governance. Although they appear the most 
likely to limit the harmful effects of fracking, they also fail to address the larger 
hybridity picture. This Part begins with a brief discussion of new governance, 
outlines a few of the frequently cited new governance approaches to fracking, 
and notes their shortcomings. 
253. Burger, supra note 211, at 153. 
254. Id. at 162. 
255. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
256. See supra Part III.A.2 for a discussion of regulatory capture in the context of the complex 
deep-sea drilling activity. 
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The new governance field devotes a substantial amount of time to 
explaining and categorizing new phenomena in governance. These phenomena 
grew out of the perceived excesses of big government. "Experimentalism" 
offered a response to command and control governance. The seminal work of 
Columbia Law School professors Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel provides 
a frequently cited starting point for the new governance discussion. In A 
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, the professors introduce the term 
"democratic experimentalism" as a critique of the limitations of the current U.S. 
system of governance. 257 Their article posits that the three branches of 
government no longer meet the myriad and complex challenges of modern 
American society. This gap, they argue, calls for a more responsive system of 
governance. The solution--democratic experimentalism-contains many 
features, but essentially decentralizes power to "enable citizens and other actors 
to utilize their local knowledge to fit solutions to their individual 
circumstances. "258 
Moreover, experimentalism allows "regional and national coordinating 
bodies ... to share their knowledge with others facing similar problems."259 
Experimentalism also combines public and private features, allowing "novel 
kinds of coordination within and among private firms, ... [which] increases the 
efficiency of public administration by encouraging mutual learning among its 
parts," and increases "accountability through participation of citizens in the 
decisions that affect them."26o In many ways, the public accountability 
framework Dorf and Sabel introduce mirrors the private sector: the public 
performs a monitoring function, and through novel participatory mechanisms is 
able to affect policy. The fracking governance scholarship is abundant with 
examples of new governance. Notable are approaches advocated by Professors 
Elizabeth Burleson, Hari Osofsky, and Hannah Wiseman. 
In her recent article regarding cooperative federalism, Elizabeth Burleson 
stresses that public participation at the outset is the key to sustainable 
development. 261 She argues for inclusive decision making that "involves the 
following: gathering stakeholders and information and then brainstorming and 
analyzing options before implementing any given approach."262 Further, 
Burleson argues that the best way to fill the current regulatory gaps within 
fracking is "through genuinely adaptive and collaborative governance."263 In 
Burleson's view, this approach at local, regional, and federal levels will 
257. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). 
258. /d. at 267. 
259. [d. 
260. [d. 
261. Burleson, supra note 172, at 327. 
262. [d. 
263. [d. at 290. 
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ameliorate much of the social risk associated with fracking development because 
it is responsive to the needs of the community.264 
Professors Osofsky and Wiseman's approach sounds similar themes. In a 
series of articles, Professors Osofsky and Wiseman describe a fragmented energy 
system.265 This fragmentation results in inefficiencies across the sector, leads to 
gaps in regulation, and inadequately responds to risk. "Hybrid governance," they 
argue, might remedy these problems in energy regulation. 266 Hybrid governance 
(not to be confused with the "hybridity" discussed in this Article) is described as 
the integration and interaction among multiple public and private actors along 
vertical and horizontal axes, which allows for the incorporation of diverse voices 
at every stage of governance. 267 In this way their approach builds on the 
experimentalist literature, which recognizes that our existing governance system 
is ill suited to address modern problems.268 
Osofsky and Wiseman's approach also discusses the transitional nature of 
our current energy system based on "emerging technology, more unpredictable 
and extreme weather events, and public pressure for cleaner energy."269 Their 
approach also tracks recent developments in fracking governance, and the 
articles attempt to fill a gap in federalism and energy scholarship by arguing that 
a hybrid governance approach may be more effective than federalism in 
addressing substantive gaps in energy law. 270 To illustrate hybrid governance, the 
pair explains how the Delaware River Basin Commission (DRBC), a federal-
interstate governmental agency that was formed in 1961 to regionally protect and 
manage the Delaware River Basin, recently exceeded its mandate as a regional 
decision-making authority to propose regulations regarding fracking.271 
Approximately thirty percent of the Delaware River Basin sits above the 
Marcellus Shale formation. 272 The agency thus has a particular interest in 
regulating fracking. All of its meetings, hearings, and advisory committees are 
open to the public. While Burleson points to the DRBC as an example of an 
agency flexible enough to engage in adaptive management, Osofsky and 
Wiseman use it as an exemplar of hybrid governance: it incorporates multiple 
264. Id. at 300. 
265. Osofsky & Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, supra note 80; Hari M. Osofsky & 
Hannah 1. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2014) [hereinafter Osofsky & 
Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance]. 
266. Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 265, at 1-2. 
267. Id. at 4. 
268. See generally Dorf & Sabel, supra note 257, at 270 (arguing that the features of American 
constitutionalism are no longer functioning as intended and do not effectively organize our 
democracy). 
269. Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 265, at 1. 
270. Id. at 4; see also Osofsky & Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, supra note 80. 
271. This approach to regional governance has been advocated as well by Daniel Honberg, who 
suggests that the gaps in governance common in cooperative federalism, dynamic federalism, and state 
or federal approaches to governance are remedied when interstate compacts are formed to meet the 
needs of a region. Daniel Honberg, Note, Fractured Oversight: A Regional Approach to Hydraulic 
Fracturing Regulation, 24 GEO. INT'LENVTL. L. REV. 591,591-92 (2012). 
272. Burleson, supra note 172, at 314. 
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voices across multiple levels of governance. 273 In both views, the DRBC should 
be held out as an example of how to manage the fracking morass. It is adaptable, 
flexible, and permits participation. 
Numerous critiques and debates surround new governance. At the heart of 
the debate is the question of whether new governance or hybrid methods of 
decision making cede too much authority to private actors, thus providing the 
opposite effect of accountability and transparency. In this way, the complexity 
that gave rise to the new governance model could operate to further obstruct 
democracy. 
For example, an underlying assumption of the hybrid governance approach 
is symmetry with respect to information. As the foregoing analysis reveals, fields 
deploying hybridity in development are notoriously asymmetric. Industry experts 
hold the relevant information; however, a collaborative approach to governance 
requires and assumes equal access to information. Experimentalist approaches to 
governance rely on actors to share information; it is unclear whether the 
incentives to share information would be great enough to avoid the problem of 
information asymmetry. Michael Burger makes a similar argument, suggesting 
that decentralized approaches to governance presume information sharing 
among key actors and that actual learning is taking place.274 He argues that there 
is no evidence that this is the case, and that a federal approach to fracking 
regulation would provide a better opportunity for "resource pooling, technical 
and regulatory information sharing, and knowledge generation than what is 
currently taking place under the decentralized approach."275 
In sum, the focus on decentralization could exacerbate the market failure 
that currently plagues hybridity.276 Recalling the financial crisis buttresses this 
argument. 277 In the lead-up to the crisis, the financial industry was quite 
decentralized and self-regulated. This regulatory approach led to systemic risk 
because the actors were consistently dispersing risks into the financial markets. 
This was not due to any malicious intent on the part of the banks. Quite simply, 
the entities are designed to maximize return and minimize their individual risk. 
What the financial crisis revealed is that private actors cannot be trusted (or 
expected) to self-regulate. Fracking developers are no different. As discussed, 
the nature of the private enterprise is to maximize shareholder value. 278 Fracking 
developers will, by virtue of their organizational structure, act to maximize 
profits. Even the most iterative governance model cannot change this 
characteristic of the firm. 
273. Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 265, at 21-31. 
274. Burger, supra note 211, at 160. 
275. [d. 
276. See OrIy Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in 
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 444 (2004) (discussing market failures in the 
context of decentralization). 
277. See supra Part III.A.1 for a discussion of the haphazard regulatory approach that led to the 
financial crisis. 
278. See supra notes 173--74 and accompanying text for an acknowledgment of the widely held 
belief that the main goal of private enterprise to maximize profits for shareholders. 
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These critiques notwithstanding, the foregoing innovative efforts to make 
sense of the fractured, fragmented,279 and gap-filled fracking governance 
pictures are noteworthy. They make valuable contributions to both the 
federalism debate and new governance literature; however, they fail to 
incorporate the larger story regarding fracking. It is development. To take it a 
step further, it reflects a particular approach to development-hybridity-that is 
rife with systemic risk. Any regulatory response to fracking must grapple with all 
of the complex features of hybridity. Until now, none of the fracking governance 
approaches directly addresses the whole of fracking's hybridity. 
B. Moving Beyond Regulation: Disrupting Hybridity 
The best way to mitigate the harm of hybridity is to address its harmful 
features. Although the current regulatory debates have value, and a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme is likely one piece of the necessary response to 
fracking, a more effective response would focus on (1) exposing difficult-to-
regulate private actors to the risks of their activities; (2) creating transactions 
that establish proportionate risk and benefit sharing among public and private 
actors to mitigate harm to public goods; and (3) reducing project scale to 
minimize systemic risks. This Part introduces several ways to reduce hybridity's 
negative impact, and suggests that this approach, coupled with a comprehensive 
and coherent regulatory approach, might mitigate, ex ante, the potential harms 
of fracking. 
1. Internalizing Developer Risk 
One way to facilitate the internalization of developer risk is to increase the 
cost of doing business. Fracking developers, like many sophisticated private 
parties, engage in fracking through subsidiaries established solely for the purpose 
of developing the project. 280 This allows developers to create distance between 
themselves-the parent entity-and the risky activity. Reducing this distance by 
allowing for a piercing of the corporate veil of the subsidiary to reach the parent-
shareholder may reduce the moral hazard that arises from the current structure 
of fracking operations. 281 Moreover, although limited liability is a classic (and 
highly valued) feature of corporate law, localities and other parties to fracking 
transactions can lessen its impact through creative contract. A simplified 
279. See Burleson, supra note 172, at 289 (describing fracking regulations as fragmented); 
Osofsky & Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, supra note 80, at 777 (describing a fragmented 
energy regulatory system); Spence, supra note 140, at 507 (referring to regulatory framework as 
fragmented). 
280. See, e.g., Daniel Gilbert, Exxon Fights over Fracking with Pennsylvania Attorney General, 
WALL ST. J. (July 10, 2014, 1:06 PM), http://www.wsj.comlarticles/exxon-says-it-is-getting-singled-out-
over-fracking-1405011974 (discussing the pending criminal action against General XTO Energy. a 
subsidiary of Exxon Mobil, in a Pennsylvania court over the alleged mishandling of "toxic wastewater" 
from the fracking operation). 
281. Note, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Damages, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 986, 999 (1986) (suggesting that parent companies be held liable for activities of 
subsidiaries who improperly dispose of hazardous waste). 
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corporate structure can be explicitly required by the contract that dictates the 
fracking relationship, or constructively, by obtaining parent guarantees that 
cover harm created by the activities of the subsidiary. Although at the outset 
changing the culture surrounding fracking may prove challenging, negotiators 
(landowners and municipalities) may point to other high-risk development 
industries (including the oil and gas industry) for examples of this type of risk 
internalization. 282 
There may be other ways to change the structure of such actors that allow 
for greater internalization of risk, but absent comprehensive regulation, creative 
contract will have to suffice. This observation is consistent with an emerging 
trend of private governance in environmental law, as noted by Michael 
Vandenbergh in The Emergence of Private Environmental Governance. 283 The 
key for those responsible for the permitting process or negotiating the lease 
agreement is to focus on the layers of complexity within the organizational 
structure. The greater the complexity, as illustrated by the financial crisis and BP 
oil spill, the more likely the developer is able to externalize risk. 284 Structuring a 
transaction to allow easier access to the developer will internalize developer risk, 
which should incentivize greater care in the fracking operation. 
2. Recalibrating Risk and Benefit Sharing 
Structuring fracking transactions to allow for greater risk and benefit 
sharing could minimize impacts on public goods. An example of a shared risk-
benefit approach would be a public-private partnership, but other transactional 
and ownership structures may provide similar benefits. 
Within the current transactional structure for fracking transactions, deals 
are typically between the subsidiary of a fracking company and the federal 
government or private landowner. Under one version of a shared framework, the 
private fracking party would form a joint venture with the locality. In a joint 
venture format, the risk taking of the private entity is more closely monitored 
but, more importantly, the locality develops much needed industry-specific 
knowledge. The joint venture would also allow the locality to reap public, 
monetary benefits that are then spread throughout the community, rather than 
isolated within a few lucky hands. The money could also go toward training 
within the industry or, even better, other renewable energy development 
projects in the area. 
282. See, e.g., Julia A. Heintz, Production Payments and Other Energy Financing Alternatives, in 
1995 OIL AND GAS ACQUISITIONS, ch. lOB (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Found. ed., 1995) 
(discussing a prepaid gas or oil contract in which the purchaser of the commodity receives collateral, 
which could include a parent guaranty). 
283. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Emergence of Private Environmental Governance, 44 
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10125, 10125-34 (2014) (noting that private environmental 
governance is a gap filler that can also complement public governance, and that fracking is one area 
that is particularly ripe for private environmental governance). 
284. See supra Parts III.A.1-2 for a discussion of how private entities externalized risk in the 
2008 financial crisis and the BP oil spill. 
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With benefit sharing comes risk sharing. Any joint venture arrangement 
would require the public entity to bear part of the financial risk of the venture. 
While this may seem like a significant downside to this type of deal structuring, 
in reality, it may lead to fewer projects that are held to higher standards. This 
would have a net positive effect on the water table, and go a long way toward 
reducing the impact of fracking in a region. 
If the government knows that it (or rather, its constituents) is on the hook 
for half of any fracking-related harm in an area, there may be a race to the 
regulatory "top," rather than a race to the bottom. The accountability features 
built into our democratic system of governance ensure these types of incentives. 
In reality, given the limited liability structure of corporations, the current model 
for fracking transactions makes the government implicitly liable for fracking-
related damage to communities anyway. At least with a mandatory public-
private partnership format for each project, the public and private actors must 
share in the upside. In addition, public involvement could increase overall 
transparency and accountability of fracking activity. 
This type of benefit sharing is analogous to the severance tax currently 
enforced in fracking states. 285 The severance tax allows the state to collect a tax 
when natural resources leave the state, and in some cases reliance on such tax 
may lead to a conflict of interest. 286 For example, states may be more apt to 
promote risky extractive activities knowing that a monetary benefit will flow 
back to the state. A joint venture model would provide a different framework. 
The explicit public risk sharing through contract distinguishes the joint venture 
from the severance tax; the public may be less tolerant of highly risky activity 
than an individual government agency that depends on the severance tax for 
survival. This public aspect provides a check on otherwise captured activity. 
3. Reducing Project Scale 
Third, reducing the density and scale of fracking projects could reduce 
systemic risks. This third recommendation is perhaps both the most 
straightforward, and the most difficult to achieve. 
Multiple fracking wells are set up on single drill pads.287 This density 
increases the potential profit of the well, and increases the likelihood of failure. 
Fracking is also dense; it covers broad swaths of land within a region, increasing 
the impact on the water supply. These two features-density and scale-are 
prime contributors to systemic risk. To reflect briefly on the financial crisis, the 
285. A recent study by the Duke University Energy Initiative notes that severance taxes, 
typically based on the volume of oil or gas production, have provided a significant amount of revenue 
in counties that do not collect property taxes on oil and gas production. DANIEL RAIMI & RICHARD G. 
NEWELL, SHALE PUBLIC FINANCE: LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVENUES AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH 
OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT, DUKE UNIV. ENERGY INITIATIVE 2 (2014). 
286. See Robertson, supra note 94, at 1294-96 (discussing the collection of Ohio severance taxes 
by the Ohio Tax Commissioner, which then pays the tax into an oil and gas fund, as a potential conflict 
of interest that may limit the ability of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources Division of Oil and 
Gas to remain neutral with respect to regulation). 
287. See supra Part III.D.1 for a primer on the fracking process. 
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scale of the activity was quite broad; most banks held risky mortgages on their 
books.288 The density of risk distribution was not revealed until the dominoes 
began to fall; the ratings agencies had failed to identify the risks of these 
instruments and parties thus found bits and pieces of the infected mortgages 
littered throughout their assets. In this case, the scope and density are known. 
When coupled with the concerns related to disclosure of the chemicals used in 
the business, the impact of the activity is less certain. Reducing the footprint of 
fracking activities, including the "go big" structure of fracking operations, might 
mitigate the systemic risks inherent in such activity. 
One way local communities and states might reduce the scale and density of 
fracking operations is by increasing the cost of doing business for those engaged 
in fracking operations. For example, the production capacity of fracked wells 
typically levels off or declines after an initial phase of productivity. This, of 
course, affects the return on investment for parties engaged in fracking. The 
ubiquity of fracking, however, lessens the impact of this dip and thus incentivizes 
a fracking operator to drill more wells with the hope of maximizing initial 
returns. Often wells are left abandoned after this initial productive phase, but the 
effects of the fracking activity remain long after the private parties have left the 
well. 
Government entities that become parties to fracking transactions can 
change this dynamic by insisting on a guaranteed return over an extended period 
of time for each well created. Well developers would be penalized for any 
shortfalls in the projected return, which could incentivize developers to choose 
more wisely and engage in less speculation when searching for shale. This private 
contractual approach to increasing the cost of doing business for fracking 
operators could lead to less density and safer fracking, thereby reducing the 
systemic risks associated with the activity. Landowners and other parties to 
fracking transactions could also engage in this type of scale-reduction activity in 
order to reduce impacts on private land and reduce the probability of an event 
that could damage groundwater or soil. 
These recommendations comprise just a few of the many tools available for 
advocates seeking to reduce the risks associated with fracking, including states 
that are cautiously optimistic about the potential benefits that fracking might 
yield, by focusing on hybridity. Key questions remain, however. Namely, how 
will the above recommendations be operationalized? And by whom? The 
following Part offers several suggestions and caveats regarding implementation 
of the foregoing interventions in hybridity. 
C. Operationalizing 
The varieties of players that make up the fracking landscape give rise to a 
variety of possible approaches to implementation. Under any approach, 
288. See supra Part IILA.1 for a discussion of the financial crisis and how the decentralized 
financial regulatory scheme contributed to the crisis. 
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however, the problems of co-opting, capture, and information asymmetry could 
resurface. 
Given the strength of the oil and gas lobby and the concerns with regulatory 
capture that abound in hybridity, state, federal, or local efforts to implement the 
changes would likely face serious difficulty. The best approach may be a bottom-
up approach, where private parties to contract insist on key contractual 
provisions that provide the types of protections discussed above. Absent 
community pressure and know-how, however, such private parties might lack 
real incentives or expertise to bargain in their neighbors' best interests. To 
combat this incentive problem, nongovernmental organizations and legal 
advocates could play a key role. Such actors might develop boilerplate 
transactional documents that serve the dual purpose of educating communities 
about the systemic risks of fracking and cutting transaction costs for those 
entering fracking negotiations. For instance, one website-FracFocus-has 
already begun to play this role in the realm of chemical disclosure. The website, 
which is managed by the Ground Water Protection Council and Interstate Oil 
and Gas Compact Commission, provides a public clearinghouse for states to list 
chemicals used for fracking. 289 
Taxpayers in fracking regions could also lean on localities to intervene and 
use their police powers to enact ordinances that provide for certain contractual 
baselines. Such localities would also have real incentives to engage in joint 
ventures with fracking developers, which could allow such municipalities to hone 
their expertise and provide much needed transparency for the transactions. The 
non-property-owning public would also have an interest in obtaining more 
concrete economic benefits from the industry, rather than the spillover effects 
common in "boom" communities. 
The key recommendations set forth here-reducing the scope and scale of 
fracking operations, and developing organizational and transactional structures 
that internalize risk for repeat players and allow for more equitable benefit 
sharing across communities-may change the face of fracking. Developers may 
hesitate to invest knowing that communities will seek to simplify transactional 
structures to force developers to internalize more of the risk. Developers may 
also be less likely to invest with the understanding that the locality will be its 
business partner and the community will share in the upside. Finally, fracking 
developers may balk at the prospect of scaling down their operations. The 
industry may collapse. Or, more likely, it may evolve. 
In this way, fracking is not only changed, but fracking, as hybridity, is 
disrupted. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Fracking is occurring within a unique development moment. This 
development moment is rife with significant development challenges, including a 
decreased or negative pace for economic growth, difficulty meeting energy 
289. About Us, FRACFocus, http://www.fracfocus.org/welcome (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
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needs, and a destabilized climate. Hybridity has emerged during this moment as 
an approach to development that thrives in the gaps of governance, relies on 
public goods, and creates tremendous amounts of unchecked systemic risk. 
Fracking fits within this paradigm. 
To date, fracking lacks a comprehensive regulatory framework. The 
attempts to regulate fracking center around regulation of the mechanism 
through federal, state, or experimental approaches. This Article disrupts and 
broadens this framing to bring fracking within the lens of development. In an era 
of development that calls for creativity, understanding an approach to 
development like hybridity-and when it is being employed-expands our 
toolkit of solutions and allows us to anticipate, ferret out, and potentially stem 
systemic risks before they have a deleterious effect on the economy or 
environment. 
